Existing law requires or authorizes a court to impose various fines, fees, and assessments on criminal defendants, including fines assessed as a penalty for a crime, restitution fines, and fees and assessments for the support and maintenance of the courts, as specified.

This bill would require a court imposing a fine, fee, or assessment related to a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or a felony to make a finding finding, as specified, that the defendant or minor has the ability to pay, as defined. The bill would require that a defendant or minor be presumed to not have the ability to pay if the defendant or minor is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility, receives need-based public assistance, is very low income, or is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or a term of life without the possibility of parole. The bill would also specify factors establishing inability to pay, as specified.

GOVERNOR'S VETO

GV Bill Id:AB 927

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Enrolled Ver:September 13, 2019

2/3 vote

SUMMARY:

Prohibits the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the person has the ability to pay.

The Senate Amendments:

1. Clarify that in making a finding of ability to pay, the court may rely on any relevant, credible evidence, including but not limited to, information contained in the probation report.
2. State that the ability to pay determination can be made at a contested hearing or based on the stipulation of counsel.

Governor's Veto Message:

This bill would prohibit a court from imposing fines, fees and assessments, without having first made a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.

I support this bill's intent. We must tackle the issue of burdensome fines, fees and assessments that disproportionately drag low-income individuals deeper into debt and away from full participation in their communities. However, I do not believe that requiring a hearing on defendants' ability to pay is the best approach in every case.

There are many ongoing conversations about how we can build a fairer criminal justice system while ensuring adequate funding for courts and victims' compensation. I believe this issue needs to be tackled in a comprehensive manner, through the budget process, and I am committed to working with the Legislature and stakeholders on ensuring this gets done.

COMMENTS:

According to the Author:

"Both the Supreme Court and a California appellate court have found that excessive fines are a violation of due process. Even absent constitutional concerns, we are all well aware of the pressures that come with excessive debt. By changing the presumption of ability to pay from defendants to prosecutors and allowing courts to easily find low-income individuals are unable to pay costly fines, AB 927 aligns California with the Constitution's promise of fundamental fairness."

Arguments in Support:

According to the California Public Defenders Association, "AB 927… serves to bring our criminal fine and assessment statutes into alignment with the state and federal constitutions. Indeed, in the recently published opinion in People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal found that imposition of court fines and fees on a defendant without inquiring into the defendant's ability to pay violated state and federal constitutional guarantees. (Id. at p. 270.) As the Duenas court put it: 'Because the only reason [the defendant] cannot pay the fine and fees is her poverty, using the criminal process to collect a fine she cannot pay is unconstitutional.' (Ibid.) AB 927 will help ensure that people are not penalized specifically for being poor. 'Whatever hardship poverty may cause in the society generally, the judicial process must make itself available to the indigent; it must free itself of sanctions born of financial inability.' (Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 87-88.) AB 927 requires courts to take into account a defendant's ability to pay court assessments, and in doing so frees our system from one particularly harmful sanction on the impoverished."

Arguments in Opposition:

According to the California Judges Association, "Just as the policy discussions and initiatives on bail reform swept through California and across the country, California is now leading the effort on economic justice regarding fees, fines and assessments that disproportionately impact low-income and minority communities. The California Judges Association supports these efforts but implores the Legislature to provide courts with alternative stable funding that will supplant the lost revenue. Absent dedicated and long-term funding, the elimination of fines and fees could impact courts' duty to dispense equal access to justice. Secured funding also ensures programs that promote rehabilitation of convicted persons and effective operation of law enforcement programs are not adversely impacted.

"For these reasons, the California Judges Association opposes AB 927 and respectfully requests the Legislature revisit this issue in the budget next year."

FISCAL COMMENTS:

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

1. Workload: Annual costs of between $23.6 million and $43 million to the courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing with all criminal and juvenile proceedings involving a misdemeanor or felony. (General Fund*)
2. State revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually to various state funds, including the General Fund. Actual loss would depend on how many defendants the courts find unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. While it is not known how many individuals would fall in this category, if this measure results in a 1-percent reduction of revenue, it would lead to a loss of almost $9 million annually to state funds. (Various funds)
3. Additionally, revenue loss to special funds may result in cost pressures to the General Fund to backfill shortages resulting from this measure. For example, the Restitution Fund received an average of $52 million annually in restitution fines over the last three fiscal years. This fund is structurally imbalances. Its projected reserve decreased from $64.7 million in 2017-18 to $41 million in 2018-19 and to $17.3 million in 2019-20. As stated above, if this measure would result in the loss of 1 percent of the average annual restitution fines revenue, it would result in a loss of $520,000 annually to the fund.
4. Local revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually. To the extent that the lower collection of fine, fee, and assessment revenue results in an increase of costs to local governments for public safety services that were included within the realigned responsibilities specified in Proposition 30 (2012), the local agencies would not be obligated to provide the required level of service above the level for which funding is provided by the state. Consequently, the provisions of this bill may lead to the additional subvention of funds to obtain local compliance, resulting in cost pressure to the General Fund. (Local funds, General Fund)

*Trial Court Trust Fund

VOTES:

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0

YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 16-0-0

YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Brough, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Diep, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-2-16

YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NO: Melendez, Obernolte

ABS, ABST OR NV: Choi, Cooley, Cooper, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Eduardo Garcia, Irwin, Kiley, Mathis, Nazarian, Patterson, Rodriguez, Voepel

SENATE FLOOR: 32-5-3

YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk

NO: Borgeas, Jones, Morrell, Nielsen, Stone

ABS, ABST OR NV: Dahle, Grove, Stern

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 63-5-11

YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mayes, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NO: Choi, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Smith

ABS, ABST OR NV: Brough, Cooper, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Irwin, Kiley, McCarty, Patterson, Rodriguez

UPDATED:

VERSION: September 13, 2019

CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002594

CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS

CSA1 Bill Id:AB 927

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Amended Ver:August 30, 2019

Majority vote

SUMMARY:

Prohibits the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the person has the ability to pay.

The Senate Amendments:

1. Clarify that in making a finding of ability to pay, the court may rely on any relevant, credible evidence, including but not limited to, information contained in the probation report.
2. State that the ability to pay determination can be made at a contested hearing or based on the stipulation of counsel.

COMMENTS:

According to the Author:

"Both the Supreme Court and a California appellate court have found that excessive fines are a violation of due process. Even absent constitutional concerns, we are all well aware of the pressures that come with excessive debt. By changing the presumption of ability to pay from defendants to prosecutors and allowing courts to easily find low-income individuals are unable to pay costly fines, AB 927 aligns California with the Constitution's promise of fundamental fairness."

Arguments in Support:

According to the California Public Defenders Association, "AB 927… serves to bring our criminal fine and assessment statutes into alignment with the state and federal constitutions. Indeed, in the recently published opinion in People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal found that imposition of court fines and fees on a defendant without inquiring into the defendant's ability to pay violated state and federal constitutional guarantees. (Id. at p. 270.) As the Duenas court put it: 'Because the only reason [the defendant] cannot pay the fine and fees is her poverty, using the criminal process to collect a fine she cannot pay is unconstitutional.' (Ibid.) AB 927 will help ensure that people are not penalized specifically for being poor. 'Whatever hardship poverty may cause in the society generally, the judicial process must make itself available to the indigent; it must free itself of sanctions born of financial inability.' (Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 87-88.) AB 927 requires courts to take into account a defendant's ability to pay court assessments, and in doing so frees our system from one particularly harmful sanction on the impoverished."

Arguments in Opposition:

According to the California Judges Association, "Just as the policy discussions and initiatives on bail reform swept through California and across the country, California is now leading the effort on economic justice regarding fees, fines and assessments that disproportionately impact low-income and minority communities. The California Judges Association supports these efforts but implores the Legislature to provide courts with alternative stable funding that will supplant the lost revenue. Absent dedicated and long-term funding, the elimination of fines and fees could impact courts’ duty to dispense equal access to justice. Secured funding also ensures programs that promote rehabilitation of convicted persons and effective operation of law enforcement programs are not adversely impacted.

"For these reasons, the California Judges Association opposes AB 927 and respectfully requests the Legislature revisit this issue in the budget next year."

FISCAL COMMENTS:

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

1) Workload: Annual costs of between $23.6 million and $43 million to the courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing with all criminal and juvenile proceedings involving a misdemeanor or felony. (General Fund*)

2) State revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually to various state funds, including the General Fund. Actual loss would depend on how many defendants the courts find unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. While it is not known how many individuals would fall in this category, if this measure results in a 1-percent reduction of revenue, it would lead to a loss of almost $9 million annually to state funds. (Various funds)

Additionally, revenue loss to special funds may result in cost pressures to the General Fund to backfill shortages resulting from this measure. For example, the Restitution Fund received an average of $52 million annually in restitution fines over the last three fiscal years. This fund is structurally imbalances. Its projected reserve decreased from $64.7 million in 2017-18 to $41 million in 2018-19 and to $17.3 million in 2019-20. As stated above, if this measure would result in the loss of 1 percent of the average annual restitution fines revenue, it would result in a loss of $520,000 annually to the fund.

1. Local revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually. To the extent that the lower collection of fine, fee, and assessment revenue results in an increase of costs to local governments for public safety services that were included within the realigned responsibilities specified in Proposition 30 (2012), the local agencies would not be obligated to provide the required level of service above the level for which funding is provided by the state. Consequently, the provisions of this bill may lead to the additional subvention of funds to obtain local compliance, resulting in cost pressure to the General Fund. (Local funds, General Fund)

*Trial Court Trust Fund

VOTES:

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0

YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 16-0-2

YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Brough, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Diep, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas

ABS, ABST OR NV: Fong, Obernolte

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-2-16

YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NO: Melendez, Obernolte

ABS, ABST OR NV: Choi, Cooley, Cooper, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Eduardo Garcia, Irwin, Kiley, Mathis, Nazarian, Patterson, Rodriguez, Voepel

SENATE FLOOR: 32-5-3

YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk

NO: Borgeas, Jones, Morrell, Nielsen, Stone

ABS, ABST OR NV: Dahle, Grove, Stern

UPDATED:

VERSION: August 30, 2019

CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002089

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: AB 927

Author: Jones-Sawyer (D)

Amended: 8/30/19 in Senate

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-1, 6/18/19

AYES: Skinner, Moorlach, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener

NOES: Morrell

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-1, 8/30/19

AYES: Portantino, Bates, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski

NOES: Jones

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-2, 5/23/19 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Crimes: fines and fees: defendant’s ability to pay

SOURCE: Author

DIGEST:

This bill prohibits the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.

ANALYSIS:

Existing federal law:

1. Prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)
   
2. Provides that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)
   
3. Prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)

Existing state law:

1. Prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)
   
2. States that when a defendant is convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment in jail or prison and that crime does not specify a fine, the court may impose a fine on the offender not exceeding $1,000 in misdemeanor cases, or $10,000 in felony cases, in addition to the imprisonment prescribed. (Penal Code § 672.)
   
3. Requires the court, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, to order the defendant to pay a restitution fine ranging between $300 and $10,000 for felonies, and $150 and $1,000 for misdemeanors. The court must impose the fine unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to, and the defendant’s ability to pay is not such a reason. (Penal Code § 1202.4 (b).)
   
4. Exempts the restitution fine from various penalty assessments. (Penal Code § 1202.4(e).)
   
5. Requires the court to assess an additional probation-revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine becomes effective upon the revocation of probation, and shall not be waived or reduced by the court, absent compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on record. (Penal Code § 1202.44.)
   
6. Requires the court to assess an additional parole-revocation restitution fine, post-release community-supervision (PRCS) revocation fine, or mandatory-supervision revocation fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine is suspended unless parole, PRCS, or mandatory supervision is revoked. (Penal Code § 1202.45.)
   
7. Levies a state penalty assessment of $10 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. Where multiple offenses are involved, the state penalty shall be based on the total fine for each case. (Penal Code § 1464.)
   
8. Requires that a state surcharge of 20 percent be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment noted above in Penal Code section 1464, with the monies going to the General Fund. (Penal Code § 1465.7.)
   
9. Requires the court to impose a $40 assessment on every conviction for a criminal offense in order to assist in funding court operations. (Penal Code, § 1465.8 (a).)
   
10. Imposes a state court construction penalty of $5 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, except as specified. (Government Code § 70372.)
    
11. Requires the court to impose a $30 assessment on every misdemeanor or felony criminal conviction in order to maintain adequate funding for court facilities. (Government Code, § 70373 (a).)
    
12. Imposes a county penalty assessment in the amount of $7 for every $10, on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. (Government Code § 76000.)
    
13. Allows a county board of supervisors to elect to levy an additional penalty in the amount of $2 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses for support of emergency medical services. (Government Code § 76000.5.)
    
14. Imposes a penalty assessment of $1 on every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, to help implement the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act. (Government Code § 76104.6.)
    
15. Levies an additional state penalty of $4 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses to be deposited into the DNA Identification Fund. (Government Code § 76104.7.)
    
16. Imposes myriad various other administrative and user fees, such as a registration fee to be represented by appointed counsel, attorney fees for appointed counsel, presentence report fees, jail booking fees, and more. (See e.g. Penal Code §§ 987.5; 987.8; 1203.1b Government Code § 29550.)
    

This bill:

1. States that in any misdemeanor or felony proceedings, the court shall make a finding, based on a contested hearing or on the stipulation of counsel, that the defendant or minor has the ability to pay before imposing any fine, fee, or assessment, with the exception of direct victim restitution.
2. Provides that in making the finding of an ability to pay the court may rely on any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, information provided in a report from the probation department.
3. Defines “ability to pay” as “the overall capability of the defendant to pay the court-ordered fines, fees, and assessments, or a portion thereof, without undue hardship.”
4. Creates a presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay under any of the following circumstances:
   1. The defendant is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility;
   2. The defendant receives need-based public assistance;
   3. The defendant is “very low income;”
   4. The defendant is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or life without parole.
5. States that other factors to be considered for an inability to pay determination include but are not limited to, the following:
   1. The defendant’s present financial circumstances;
   2. Whether the defendant is receiving any type of government benefits, including means-tested benefits;
   3. Whether the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel;
   4. The defendant’s reasonably discernible future financial circumstances, including the imposed term of incarceration;
   5. The likelihood that the defendant will be able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the court’s consideration of the issue;
   6. The amount of victim restitution ordered, if any; and,
   7. Any other factor that may bear upon the defendant’s inability to pay.
6. Provides that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay.

Background

In People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Second District Court of Appeal recently held that imposing court fines and assessments on indigent defendants who lack the ability to pay violates the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and California Constitutions. (Id. at p. 1168.)

In Duenas, the trial court imposed $220 in fines and fees when an indigent, homeless mother of three children pleaded no contest to driving a suspended license. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) The court ordered that any outstanding debt at the end of Ms. Duenas’s probation would go to collections without further court order. (Ibid.) Ms. Duenas argued on appeal that the failure to consider her ability to pay before imposition of these charges violates due process. (Ibid.) Specifically, Duenas argued that laws imposing mandatory fines on people who are too poor to pay essential punish these persons for their poverty. (Id. at p. 1164.)

The Court of Appeal agreed. The court noted that “’Raising money for government through law enforcement, whatever the source … can law a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that debt, along with attendant court appearances, can lead to a loss of employment or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding financial burden- a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is intractable.’” (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1163.) The court relied on well-established case law holding that the State cannot inflict punishment on an indigent criminal defendant solely based on his or her poverty. (Id. at pp. 1166-1167, citing In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100; Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660 [103 S.Ct. 2064]; and Tate v. Short (1971) 401 U.S. 395 [91 S.Ct. 668].) The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that imposition of fines on people who cannot pay them is not punishment because such people do not face imprisonment for failure to pay, noting that punishment is not restricted to incarceration. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1167-1168.) The court reversed the fees for court facilities and court operations, and stayed the restitution fine. The court remanded the case with directions that the charges be stayed until and unless prosecution establishes the defendant has the ability to pay them. (Id. at pp. 1172-1173.)

The court invited the Legislature to consider whether the statutes should be amended to direct a trial court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.)

Although the Duenas opinion dealt with three discreet fines and assessments, its rationale arguably applies to every criminal fine, fee, and assessment.

A separate U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. __ [203 L.Ed.2d 11] made a similar finding to Duenas. Timbs was a case dealing with asset forfeiture, not specifically fines. Timbs was charged with three felonies stemming from the transportation of heroin. He pleaded guilty to two of the charges. The court sentenced Timbs to six years and ordered him pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. Additionally, the prosecutor sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover, which was purchased for $42,000. Timbs argued that the seizure was an excessive fine, because it was more than four times the $10,000 maximum fine which could be imposed for his conviction under state law. (Timbs, supra, 230 L.Ed.2d at p. 15.) The Supreme Court agreed and unanimously ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines applies to the states under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at p. 17.) The Court noted that the Excessive Fines clause, which “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense” is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (Id. at pp. 17, 19, citations omitted.) The opinion also recognized that “fines may be employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’” (Id. at p. 18, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 979, fn. 9.)

Consistent with the above cases, this bill would require the court to consider the defendant’s ability pay before imposition of any fine, fee, or assessment in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony. It creates a presumption of an inability to pay if specified factors exist and states that the prosecution shall bear the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay. It also sets for other factors that can be considered to establish the inability to pay.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

1. Workload: Annual costs of between $23.6 million and $43 million to the courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing with all criminal and juvenile proceedings involving a misdemeanor or felony. (General Fund*)
2. State revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually to various state funds, including the General Fund. Actual loss would depend on how many defendants the courts find unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. While it is not known how many individuals would fall in this category, if this measure results in a 1-percent reduction of revenue, it would lead to a loss of almost $9 million annually to state funds. (Various funds)

Additionally, revenue loss to special funds may result in cost pressures to the General Fund to backfill shortages resulting from this measure. For example, the Restitution Fund received an average of $52 million annually in restitution fines over the last three fiscal years. This fund is structurally imbalances. Its projected reserve decreased from $64.7 million in 2017-18 to $41 million in 2018-19 and to $17.3 million in 2019-20. As stated above, if this measure would result in the loss of 1 percent of the average annual restitution fines revenue, it would result in a loss of $520,000 annually to the fund.

1. Local revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually. To the extent that the lower collection of fine, fee, and assessment revenue results in an increase of costs to local governments for public safety services that were included within the realigned responsibilities specified in Proposition 30 (2012), the local agencies would not be obligated to provide the required level of service above the level for which funding is provided by the state. Consequently, the provisions of this bill may lead to the additional subvention of funds to obtain local compliance, resulting in cost pressure to the General Fund. (Local funds, General Fund)

*Trial Court Trust Fund

SUPPORT: (Verified 8/30/19)

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice

National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter

NextGen California

Root and Rebound

OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/30/19)

None received

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-2, 5/23/19

AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NOES: Melendez, Obernolte

NO VOTE RECORDED: Choi, Cooley, Cooper, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Eduardo Garcia, Irwin, Kiley, Mathis, Nazarian, Patterson, Rodriguez, Voepel

Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /

9/3/19 8:55:27

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair

2019 - 2020 Regular Session

AB 927 (Jones-Sawyer) - Crimes: fines and fees: defendant’s ability to pay

*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********

The following information is revised to reflect amendments

adopted by the committee on August 30, 2019

Bill Summary:

AB 927 would require a court imposing a fine, fee, or assessment related to a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or a felony to make a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay, as defined.

Fiscal Impact:

• Workload: Annual costs of between $23.6 million and $43 million to the courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing with all criminal and juvenile proceedings involving a misdemeanor or felony. (General Fund*)
• State revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually to various state funds, including the General Fund. Actual loss would depend on how many defendants the courts find unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. While it is not known how many individuals would fall in this category, if this measure results in a 1-percent reduction of revenue, it would lead to a loss of almost $9 million annually to state funds. (Various funds)

Additionally, revenue loss to special funds may result in cost pressures to the General Fund to backfill shortages resulting from this measure. For example, the Restitution Fund received an average of $52 million annually in restitution fines over the last three fiscal years. This fund is structurally imbalances. Its projected reserve decreased from $64.7 million in 2017-18 to $41 million in 2018-19 and to $17.3 million in 2019-20. As stated above, if this measure would result in the loss of 1 percent of the average annual restitution fines revenue, it would result in a loss of $520,000 annually to the fund.

• Local revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually. To the extent that the lower collection of fine, fee, and assessment revenue results in an increase of costs to local governments for public safety services that were included within the realigned responsibilities specified in Proposition 30 (2012), the local agencies would not be obligated to provide the required level of service above the level for which funding is provided by the state. Consequently, the provisions of this bill may lead to the additional subvention of funds to obtain local compliance, resulting in cost pressure to the General Fund. (Local funds, General Fund)

*Trial Court Trust Fund

Author Amendments:

Expand the ability to pay determination requirement to minors.

-- END --

SENATE COMMITTEE ON

Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair

2019 - 2020 Regular Session

AB 927 (Jones-Sawyer) - Crimes: fines and fees: defendant’s ability to pay

Bill Summary:

AB 927 would require a court imposing a fine, fee, or assessment related to a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or a felony to make a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay, as defined.

Fiscal Impact:

• Workload: Annual costs of between $23.6 million and $43 million to the courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing with all criminal and juvenile proceedings involving a misdemeanor or felony. (General Fund*)
• State revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually to various state funds, including the General Fund. Actual loss would depend on how many defendants the courts find unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. While it is not known how many individuals would fall in this category, if this measure results in a 1-percent reduction of revenue, it would lead to a loss of almost $9 million annually to state funds. (Various funds)

Additionally, revenue loss to special funds may result in cost pressures to the General Fund to backfill shortages resulting from this measure. For example, the Restitution Fund received an average of $52 million annually in restitution fines over the last three fiscal years. This fund is structurally imbalances. Its projected reserve decreased from $64.7 million in 2017-18 to $41 million in 2018-19 and to $17.3 million in 2019-20. As stated above, if this measure would result in the loss of 1 percent of the average annual restitution fines revenue, it would result in a loss of $520,000 annually to the fund.

• Local revenue loss: Unknown, likely-major revenue reduction in the low millions of dollars annually. To the extent that the lower collection of fine, fee, and assessment revenue results in an increase of costs to local governments for public safety services that were included within the realigned responsibilities specified in Proposition 30 (2012), the local agencies would not be obligated to provide the required level of service above the level for which funding is provided by the state. Consequently, the provisions of this bill may lead to the additional subvention of funds to obtain local compliance, resulting in cost pressure to the General Fund. (Local funds, General Fund)

*Trial Court Trust Fund

Background:

There are various fines, fees, and assessments imposed on individuals upon a criminal arrest, prosecution, or conviction. Generally, these fees are related to the cost of administering the criminal justice system, including administering probation and diversion programs, collecting restitution orders, processing arrests and citations, administering drug testing, incarcerating individuals, facilitating medical visits, sealing or expunging criminal records, punishing the lack of a person’s appearance in court, monitoring a person while on parole, and using an IID as a condition to drive and to reinstate driving privileges.

Additionally, county public defenders’ offices are required to defend any person who is charged with the commission of a crime but is not financially able to hire an attorney. At the conclusion of a trial, the court may make a determination of a defendant’s present ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of the public defender; this may include an examination and determination by the court of whether the defendant owns real estate or other assets upon which a lien may be imposed. If the court finds that the defendant has the financial ability to pay, the court must order the defendant to pay all or a part of the costs the court believes reasonable and compatible with the defendant’s financial ability.

Proposed Law:

This bill would:

• Require a court imposing a fine, fee, or assessment, but not including an order of victim restitution, related to a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or a felony to make a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.
• Define “ability to pay” to mean the overall capability of the defendant to pay the court-ordered fines, fees, and assessments, or a portion thereof, without undue hardship.
• Presume that the defendant does not have the ability to pay in any of the following circumstances:
  • The person is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility.
  • The person receives need-based public assistance.
  • The person is very low income, as defined in existing law.
  • The person is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
• Provide that other factors establishing inability to pay include, but are not limited to, the following:
  • The person’s present financial circumstances.
  • Whether the person is receiving any type of government benefits, including means-tested benefits.
  • Whether the person was represented by court-appointed counsel.
  • The person’s reasonably discernible future financial circumstances, taking into consideration the imposed term of incarceration.
  • The likelihood that the person will be able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the court’s consideration of the issue.
  • The amount of victim restitution ordered, if any.
  • Any other factor that may bear upon the defendant’s inability to pay.
• Places the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay on the prosecution.
• Exclude an order of victim restitution from the provisions of this measure.

Related Legislation:

AB 1394 (Daly, 2019) would prohibit a court or probation department from charging any applicant a filing fee to petition to seal juvenile court records. AB 1394 is pending on the Suspense File of this Committee.

SB 144 (Mitchell, 2019) would eliminate a number of administrative fees imposed on a person related to involvement in the criminal justice system. SB 144 is pending in the Assembly Committee on Public Safety.

SB 190 (Mitchell, Ch. 678, Stats. 2017) repealed the authority of local agencies to assess and collect fees against families of person subject to the juvenile delinquency system.

Staff Comments:

In addition to the base fine amount that is set in statute, the courts are required to order a defendant convicted of, or a youth found to have committed, a crime to pay a number of fines, fees, and assessments. These include the state penalty assessment, county penalty assessment, court construction penalty assessment, Proposition 69 DNA penalty assessment, DNA Identification Fund penalty assessment, EMS penalty assessment, EMAT penalty assessment, state surcharge, court operations assessment, conviction assessment fee, and restitution fine (which is separate from a direct restitution order owed to the victim). These charges usually are a per-unit amount (e.g., $10 for every $10 of a base fine) or a percentage (e.g., the state surcharge is 20 percent of the base fine). The restitution fine is a set amount of a $150 minimum per misdemeanor conviction and $300 minimum per felony conviction. Moreover, depending on the crime involved, courts and counties may impose additional charges on the defendant. These include the DUI lab test penalty assessment, alcohol education penalty assessment, and county alcohol and drug program penalty assessment. Judges have some discretion to reduce the amount owed by waiving or reducing certain charges.

As stated by the Legislative Analyst’s Office during its presentation on the overview of state criminal fines and fees and probation fees to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety on February 5, 2019, the state and local governments received an estimated total of $1.7 billion in fine and fee revenue in 2015-16, the most-recent year for which the office analyzed data. The state receives a little more than half of that amount, with about 60 percent of the state’s portion going to support trial court operations and construction. Of the revenue allocated to local governments (about 42 percent of the total), counties receive about 80 percent. The remainder (of about 7 percent) goes to cover costs of the entities operating collection programs—either the trial courts or counties. As stated above, it is not known how many individuals would be found by the courts who would be unable to pay fines, fees, and assessments. If this bill leads to a 1-percent reduction in revenue collected and distributed, using the 2015-16 figures, it would result in revenue loss of approximately $8.7 million to the state, of which $5.2 million would be allocated to court operation and construction. Likewise, local agencies would lose roughly $7.1 million. These figures do not encapsulate revenue allocated to offset collection operation costs.

Recommended Amendments:

The provision of this bill that would place the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay on the prosecution is listed as one of eight factors establishing inability to pay under subdivision (d) of proposed Penal Code section 19.5. The author may wish to make this provision a separate subdivision (e).

-- END --

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair

2019 - 2020 Regular

Bill No: AB 927 Hearing Date: June 18, 2019

Subject: Crimes: Fines and Fees: Defendant’s Ability to Pay

HISTORY

Source: Author

Prior Legislation: AB 2177 (Jones-Sawyer) held in Senate Appropriations 2018

SB 881 (Hertzberg) Chapter 779, Stats. 2016

SB 366 (Wright) held Senate Appropriations 2013

Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter

Opposition: None known

Assembly Floor Vote: 62 - 2

PURPOSE

The purpose of this bill is to prohibit the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.

Existing law prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)

Existing law provides that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)

Existing law prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)

Existing law prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)

Existing law states that when a defendant is convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment in jail or prison and that crime does not specify a fine, the court may impose a fine on the offender not exceeding $1,000 in misdemeanor cases, or $10,000 in felony cases, in addition to the imprisonment prescribed. (Penal Code § 672.)

Existing law requires the court, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, to order the defendant to pay a restitution fine ranging between $300 and $10,000 for felonies, and $150 and $1,000 for misdemeanors. The court must impose the fine unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to, and the defendant’s ability to pay is not such a reason. (Penal Code § 1202.4 (b).)

Existing law exempts the restitution fine from various penalty assessments. (Penal Code § 1202.4(e).)

Existing law requires the court to assess an additional probation-revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine becomes effective upon the revocation of probation, and shall not be waived or reduced by the court, absent compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on record. (Penal Code § 1202.44.)

Existing law requires the court to assess an additional parole-revocation restitution fine, post-release community-supervision (PRCS) revocation fine, or mandatory-supervision revocation fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine is suspended unless parole, PRCS, or mandatory supervision is revoked. (Penal Code § 1202.45.)

Existing law levies a state penalty assessment of $10 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. Where multiple offenses are involved, the state penalty shall be based on the total fine for each case. (Penal Code § 1464.)

Existing law requires that a state surcharge of 20 percent be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment noted above in Penal Code section 1464, with the monies going to the General Fund. (Penal Code § 1465.7.)

Existing law requires the court to impose a $40 assessment on every conviction for a criminal offense in order to assist in funding court operations. (Penal Code, § 1465.8 (a).)

Existing law imposes a state court construction penalty of $5 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, except as specified. (Government Code § 70372.)

Existing law requires the court to impose a $30 assessment on every misdemeanor or felony criminal conviction in order to maintain adequate funding for court facilities. (Government Code, § 70373 (a).)

Existing law imposes a county penalty assessment in the amount of $7 for every $10, on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. (Government Code § 76000.)

Existing law allows a county board of supervisors to elect to levy an additional penalty in the amount of $2 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses for support of emergency medical services. (Government Code § 76000.5.)

Existing law imposes a penalty assessment of $1 on every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, to help implement the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act. (Government Code § 76104.6.)

Existing law levies an additional state penalty of $4 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses to be deposited into the DNA Identification Fund. (Government Code § 76104.7.)

Existing law imposes myriad various other administrative and user fees, such as a registration fee to be represented by appointed counsel, attorney fees for appointed counsel, presentence report fees, jail booking fees, and more. (See e.g. Penal Code §§ 987.5; 987.8; 1203.1b Government Code § 29550.)

This bill states that in any misdemeanor or felony proceedings, the court must consider the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing any fine, fee, or assessment, with the exception of direct victim restitution.

This bill defines “ability to pay” as “the overall capability of the defendant to pay the court-ordered fines, fees, and assessments, or a portion thereof, without undue hardship.”

This bill creates a presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay under any of the following circumstances:

• 1. The defendant is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility;
  2. The defendant receives need-based public assistance;
  3. The defendant is “very low income;”
  4. The defendant is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or life without parole.

This bill states that other factors to be considered for an inability to pay determination include but are not limited to, the following:

• 1. The defendant’s present financial circumstances;
  2. Whether the defendant is receiving any type of government benefits, including means-tested benefits;
  3. Whether the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel;
  4. The defendant’s reasonably discernible future financial circumstances, including the imposed term of incarceration;
  5. The likelihood that the defendant will be able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the court’s consideration of the issue;
  6. The amount of victim restitution ordered, if any; and,
  7. Any other factor that may bear upon the defendant’s inability to pay.

This bill provides that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay.

COMMENTS

1. Need for This Bill

According to the author:

In California, both the Government and Penal Code contain sections that require a court to assess certain fines on criminal defendants. These fines, assessed without regard to a defendant’s ability to pay, go to funds that provide money for at least 50 different state and local government programs.

There is over $10 billion in outstanding debt. Last year, the court collected on $1.5 billion in funds, over 1/3 of which was sent to collections. The state paid nearly $113 million to collect that $530 million.

On January 8, 2019, the Second Court of Appeal held that the mandatory imposition of certain fines on criminal defendants, without regard for their ability to pay, was a violation of that defendant’s right to due process.

The Supreme Court has also recognized the unconstitutional nature of excessive fines and the danger that they pose to civil liberties. In Timbs v. Indiana, Justice Ginsberg wrote, “For good reason, the protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history. Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties.”

In recognition of the fact that these hefty fines are often levied on the poor, Judicial Council, following the work of the Commission on the Future of California’s Court System, has been working to pilot an app that would allow defendants to seek reduced or waived fines for traffic fines which make up two-thirds of assessed fines. This bill would address the other one-third of fines for misdemeanors and felonies, both of which require the defendant to appear in court which cuts down on workload significantly.

1. Recent Case Law on Constitutional Protections against Excessive Fines

In People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Second District Court of Appeal recently held that imposing court fines and assessments on indigent defendants who lack the ability to pay violates the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and California Constitutions. (Id. at p. 1168.)

In Duenas, the trial court imposed $220 in fines and fees when an indigent, homeless mother of three children pleaded no contest to driving a suspended license.^[1] (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) The court ordered that any outstanding debt at the end of Ms. Duenas’s probation would go to collections without further court order. (Ibid.) Ms. Duenas argued on appeal that the failure to consider her ability to pay before imposition of these charges violates due process.^[2] (Ibid.) Specifically, Duenas argued that laws imposing mandatory fines on people who are too poor to pay essential punish these persons for their poverty. (Id. at p. 1164.)

The Court of Appeal agreed. The court noted that “’Raising money for government through law enforcement, whatever the source … can law a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that debt, along with attendant court appearances, can lead to a loss of employment or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding financial burden- a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is intractable.’” (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1163.) The court relied on well-established case law holding that the State cannot inflict punishment on an indigent criminal defendant solely based on his or her poverty. (Id. at pp. 1166-1167, citing In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100; Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660 [103 S.Ct. 2064]; and Tate v. Short (1971) 401 U.S. 395 [91 S.Ct. 668].) The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that imposition of fines on people who cannot pay them is not punishment because such people do not face imprisonment for failure to pay, noting that punishment is not restricted to incarceration. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1167-1168.) The court reversed the fees for court facilities and court operations, and stayed the restitution fine. The court remanded the case with directions that the charges be stayed until and unless prosecution establishes the defendant has the ability to pay them. (Id. at pp. 1172-1173.)
The court invited the Legislature to consider whether the statutes should be amended to direct a trial court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.)

Although the Duenas opinion dealt with three discreet fines and assessments, its rationale arguably applies to every criminal fine, fee, and assessment.

A separate U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. __ [203 L.Ed.2d 11] made a similar finding to Duenas. Timbs was a case dealing with asset forfeiture, not specifically fines. Timbs was charged with three felonies stemming from the transportation of heroin. He pleaded guilty to two of the charges. The court sentenced Timbs to six years and ordered him pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. Additionally, the prosecutor sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover, which was purchased for $42,000. Timbs argued that the seizure was an excessive fine, because it was more than four times the $10,000 maximum fine which could be imposed for his conviction under state law. (Timbs, supra, 230 L.Ed.2d at p. 15.) The Supreme Court agreed and unanimously ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines applies to the states under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at p. 17.) The Court noted that the Excessive Fines clause, which “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense” is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (Id. at pp. 17, 19, citations omitted.) The opinion also recognized that “fines may be employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’” (Id. at p. 18, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 979, fn. 9.)

1. Requiring the court consider the ability to pay.

Consistent with these constitutional protections, this bill would require the court to consider the defendant’s ability pay before imposition of any fine, fee, or assessment in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony. It creates a presumption of an inability to pay if specified factors exist and states that the prosecution shall bear the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay. It also sets for other factors that can be considered to establish the inability to pay.

-- END –

1. The suspended license was the result of the inability to pay over $1000 arising from three juvenile citations. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161.) ↑

2. Amicus Curiae Los Angeles County Public Defender also argued that imposing a restitution fine without considering ability to pay also violates the prohibition on excessive fines. The Court of Appeal did not specifically address this claim, noting that the due process and excessive fines analysis are sufficiently similar that they reach the same result. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 1171, fn. 8.) ↑

ASSEMBLY THIRD READING

ATR Bill Id:AB 927

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Amended Ver:March 27, 2019

Majority vote

SUMMARY:

Prohibits the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.

Major Provisions

1. States that in any misdemeanor or felony proceedings, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay before imposing any fine, fee, or assessment, with the exception of direct victim restitution.
2. Defines "ability to pay" as "the overall capability of the defendant to pay the court-ordered fines, fees, and assessments, or a portion thereof, without undue hardship."
3. Creates a presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay under any of the following circumstances:
   1. The defendant is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility;
   2. The defendant receives need-based public assistance;
   3. The defendant is "very low income;"
   4. The defendant is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or life without parole.
4. States that other factors to be considered for an inability to pay determination include, but are not limited to, the following:
   1. The defendant's present financial circumstances;
   2. Whether the defendant is receiving any type of government benefits, including means-tested benefits;
   3. Whether the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel;
   4. The defendant's reasonably discernible future financial circumstances, including the imposed term of incarceration;
   5. The likelihood that the defendant will be able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the court's consideration of the issue;
   6. The amount of victim restitution ordered, if any; and,
   7. Any other factor that may bear upon the defendant's inability to pay.
5. Provides that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay.

COMMENTS:

According to the Author:

"Both the Supreme Court and a California appellate court have found that excessive fines are a violation of due process. Even absent constitutional concerns, we are all well aware of the pressures that come with excessive debt. By changing the presumption of ability to pay from defendants to prosecutors and allowing courts to easily find low-income individuals are unable to pay costly fines, AB 927 aligns California with the Constitution's promise of fundamental fairness."

Arguments in Support:

According to the California Public Defenders Association, "AB 927… serves to bring our criminal fine and assessment statutes into alignment with the state and federal constitutions. Indeed, in the recently published opinion in People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal found that imposition of court fines and fees on a defendant without inquiring into the defendant's ability to pay violated state and federal constitutional guarantees. (Id. at p. 270.) As the Duenas court put it: 'Because the only reason [the defendant] cannot pay the fine and fees is her poverty, using the criminal process to collect a fine she cannot pay is unconstitutional.' (Ibid.) AB 927 will help ensure that people are not penalized specifically for being poor. 'Whatever hardship poverty may cause in the society generally, the judicial process must make itself available to the indigent; it must free itself of sanctions born of financial inability.' (Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 87-88.) AB 927 requires courts to take into account a defendant's ability to pay court assessments, and in doing so frees our system from one particularly harmful sanction on the impoverished."

Arguments in Opposition:

None.

FISCAL COMMENTS:

According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:

1. Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund/GF) between $35 million dollars and $58 million dollars annually in increased workload for courts to determine a person's ability to pay any relevant fines, fees or penalties at all adult and juvenile sentencing hearings.
2. Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund/GF) of approximately $12.2 million dollars and $36.9 million dollars annually in lost revenue depending on the frequency with which courts waive imposition of fines, fees or penalties, as required by this bill.
3. Costs potentially in the tens of millions of dollars annually in the form of lost revenue (Restitution Fund) depending on how often a court waives imposition of the restitution fine based on a court's determination of the defendant's ability to pay. In fiscal year 2017-18, approximately $50 million was deposited into the Restitution Fund from amounts levied in restitution fines on criminal convictions.

Please see the policy committee analysis for a full discussion of this bill.

VOTES:

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0

YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 16-0-2

YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Brough, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Diep, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas

ABS, ABST OR NV: Fong, Obernolte

UPDATED:

VERSION: March 27, 2019

CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000657

Date of Hearing: April 10, 2019

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Lorena Gonzalez, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 927

Author:(Jones-Sawyer) – As Amended Ver:March 27, 2019

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No

SUMMARY:

This bill requires a court imposing a fine, fee or assessment related to an adult or juvenile criminal proceeding or conviction involving a misdemeanor or a felony to make a finding as to the defendant’s ability to pay any fines, fees or penalties. The bill also requires that a defendant be presumed not to have the ability to pay if the defendant is homeless, lives in a shelter or lives in a transitional living facility, receives need-based public assistance, is very low income or is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or a term of life without the possibility of parole.

FISCAL EFFECT:

1. Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund/GF) between $35 million dollars and $58 million dollars annually in increased workload for courts to determine a person’s ability to pay any relevant fines, fees or penalties at all adult and juvenile sentencing hearings.
   
2. Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund/GF) of approximately $12.2 million dollars and $36.9 million dollars annually in lost revenue depending on the frequency with which courts waive imposition of fines, fees or penalties, as required by this bill.
   
3. Costs potentially in the tens of millions of dollars annually in the form of lost revenue (Restitution Fund) depending on how often a court waives imposition of the restitution fine based on a court’s determination of the defendant’s ability to pay. In fiscal year 2017-18, approximately $50 million was deposited into the Restitution Fund from amounts levied in restitution fines on criminal convictions.

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. According to the author:

Both the Supreme Court and a California appellate court have found that excessive fines are a violation of due process. Even absent constitutional concerns, we are all well aware of the pressures that come with excessive debt. By changing the presumption of ability to pay from defendants to prosecutors and allowing courts to easily find low-income individuals are unable to pay costly fines, AB 927 aligns California with the Constitution’s promise of fundamental fairness.

1. Background. Court-imposed assessments for convictions of misdemeanors and felonies fund, in part, trial court administration and construction. Judicial Council estimated that, in 2018, it collected $1.5 billion from court-ordered fines, fees, forfeitures, penalties and assessments. Of the amount collected, $583.5 million was from delinquent court-ordered debt. However, hundreds of millions of dollars were never collected from defendants with significant, long-term consequences to defendants for their failure to pay. Courts currently have no discretion in imposing the criminal assessment and court operations fees pursuant to Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code 1465.8. Additionally, a recent Appellate Court decision determined that courts may not impose fines and fees on defendants with no ability to pay and to do so violates state and federal due process. (People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.) This bill does not apply to infractions. The courts would still receive approximately $208 million dollars annually in criminal conviction assessment fees on infractions.
2. Related Legislation.
   1. AB 227 (Jones-Sawyer) authorizes a court to waive imposition of a criminal conviction assessment fee, court operations assessment fee or restitution fine based on the court’s determination of the defendant’s ability to pay. AB 227 is pending on the Assembly Appropriations Committee Suspense File.
   2. AB 1077 (Eggman) requires a collaborative court to waive all penalties assessed over the base fines for current and prior non-felony violations of the Vehicle Code and infraction and misdemeanor non-moving violations. AB 1077 is pending hearing in this committee.
3. Prior Legislation. SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, Statutes of 2017, limits the authority of local agencies to assess and collect specified fees against persons subject to the juvenile delinquency system.

Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing: April 2, 2019

Counsel: Sandy Uribe

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 927

Author:(Jones-Sawyer) – As Amended Ver:March 27, 2019

SUMMARY:

Prohibits the court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding involving a misdemeanor or felony from imposing fines, fees, and assessments, without making a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay. Specifically, this bill:

1. States that in any misdemeanor or felony proceedings, the court must consider the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing any fine, fee, or assessment, with the exception of direct victim restitution.
2. Defines “ability to pay” as “the overall capability of the defendant to pay the court-ordered fines, fees, and assessments, or a portion thereof, without undue hardship.”
3. Creates a presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay under any of the following circumstances:
   1. The defendant is homeless, lives in a shelter, or lives in a transitional living facility;
   2. The defendant receives need-based public assistance;
   3. The defendant is “very low income;”
   4. The defendant is sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term or life without parole.
4. States that other factors to be considered for an inability to pay determination include, but are not limited to, the following:
   1. The defendant’s present financial circumstances;
   2. Whether the defendant is receiving any type of government benefits, including means-tested benefits;
   3. Whether the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel;
   4. The defendant’s reasonably discernible future financial circumstances, including the imposed term of incarceration;
   5. The likelihood that the defendant will be able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the court’s consideration of the issue;
   6. The amount of victim restitution ordered, if any; and,
   7. Any other factor that may bear upon the defendant’s inability to pay.
5. Provides that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the defendant does not have the ability to pay.

EXISTING STATE LAW:

1. Prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)
   
2. States that when a defendant is convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment in jail or prison and that crime does not specify a fine, the court may impose a fine on the offender not exceeding $1,000 in misdemeanor cases, or $10,000 in felony cases, in addition to the imprisonment prescribed. (Pen. Code, § 672.)
   
3. Requires the court, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, to order the defendant to pay a restitution fine ranging between $300 and $10,000 for felonies, and $150 and $1,000 for misdemeanors. The court must impose the fine unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to, and the defendant’s ability to pay is not such a reason. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd, (b).)
   
4. Exempts the restitution fine from various penalty assessments. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd, (e).)
   
5. Requires the court to assess an additional probation-revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine becomes effective upon the revocation of probation, and shall not be waived or reduced by the court, absent compelling and extraordinary reasons stated on record. (Pen. Code § 1202.44.)
   
6. Requires the court to assess an additional parole-revocation restitution fine, post-release community-supervision (PRCS) revocation fine, or mandatory-supervision revocation fine in the same amount as that imposed for the restitution fine. This additional fine is suspended unless parole, PRCS, or mandatory supervision is revoked. (Pen. Code § 1202.45.)
   
7. Levies a state penalty assessment of $10 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. Where multiple offenses are involved, the state penalty shall be based on the total fine for each case. (Pen. Code, § 1464.)
   
8. Requires that a state surcharge of 20 percent be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment noted above in Penal Code section 1464, with the monies going to the General Fund. (Pen. Code, § 1465.7.)
   
9. Requires the court to impose a $40 assessment on every conviction for a criminal offense in order to assist in funding court operations. (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a).)
   
10. Imposes a state court construction penalty of $5 for every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, except as specified. (Gov. Code, § 70372.)
    
11. Requires the court to impose a $30 assessment on every misdemeanor or felony criminal conviction in order to maintain adequate funding for court facilities. (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a).)
    
12. Imposes a county penalty assessment in the amount of $7 for every $10, on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses. (Gov. Code, § 76000.)
    
13. Allows a county board of supervisors to elect to levy an additional penalty in the amount of $2 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses for support of emergency medical services. (Gov. Code, § 76000.5.)
    
14. Imposes a penalty assessment of $1 on every $10 on every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, to help implement the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act. (Gov. Code, § 76104.6.)
    
15. Levies an additional state penalty of $4 for every $10 upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses to be deposited into the DNA Identification Fund. (Gov. Code, § 76104.7.)
    
16. Imposes myriad various other administrative and user fees, such as a registration fee to be represented by appointed counsel, attorney fees for appointed counsel, presentence report fees, jail booking fees, and more. (See e.g. Pen. Code, §§ 987.5; 987.8; 1203.1bGov. Code, § 29550.)
    

EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:

1. 
   
2. Prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)
   
3. Provides that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)
   
4. Prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)

FISCAL EFFECT:

Unknown

COMMENTS:

1. Author's Statement: According to the author, “Both the Supreme Court and a California appellate court have found that excessive fines are a violation of due process. Even absent constitutional concerns, we are all well aware of the pressures that come with excessive debt. By changing the presumption of ability to pay from defendants to prosecutors and allowing courts to easily find low-income individuals are unable to pay costly fines, AB 927 aligns California with the Constitution’s promise of fundamental fairness.”
2. Recent Case Law on Constitutional Protections against Excessive Fines: In People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Second District Court of Appeal recently held that imposing court fines and assessments on indigent defendants who lack the ability to pay violates the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and California Constitutions. (Id. at p. 1168.)
   
   In Duenas, the trial court imposed $220 in fines and fees when an indigent, homeless mother of three children pleaded no contest to driving a suspended license.^[1] (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) The court ordered that any outstanding debt at the end of Ms. Duenas’s probation would go to collections without further court order. (Ibid.) Ms. Duenas argued on appeal that the failure to consider her ability to pay before imposition of these charges violates due process.^[2] (Ibid.) Specifically, Duenas argued that laws imposing mandatory fines on people who are too poor to pay essential punish these persons for their poverty. (Id. at p. 1164.)
   

The Court of Appeal agreed. The court noted that “’Raising money for government through law enforcement, whatever the source … can law a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that debt, along with attendant court appearances, can lead to a loss of employment or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding financial burden- a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is intractable.’” (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1163.) The court relied on well-established case law holding that the State cannot inflict punishment on an indigent criminal defendant solely based on his or her poverty. (Id. at pp. 1166-1167, citing In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100; Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660 [103 S.Ct. 2064]; and Tate v. Short (1971) 401 U.S. 395 [91 S.Ct. 668].) The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that imposition of fines on people who cannot pay them is not punishment because such people do not face imprisonment for failure to pay, noting that punishment is not restricted to incarceration. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1167-1168.) The court reversed the fees for court facilities and court operations, and stayed the restitution fine. The court remanded the case with directions that the charges be stayed until and unless prosecution establishes the defendant has the ability to pay them. (Id. at pp. 1172-1173.)
The court invited the Legislature to consider whether the statutes should be amended to direct a trial court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.)

Although the Duenas opinion dealt with three discreet fines and assessments, its rationale arguably applies to every criminal fine, fee, and assessment.

The Duenas decision was recently bolstered by a separate U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. __ [203 L.Ed.2d 11]. Timbs was a case dealing with asset forfeiture, not specifically fines. Timbs was charged with three felonies stemming from the transportation of heroin. He pleaded guilty to two of the charges. The court sentenced Timbs to six years and ordered him pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. Additionally, the prosecutor sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover, which was purchased for $42,000. Timbs argued that the seizure was an excessive fine, because it was more than four times the $10,000 maximum fine which could be imposed for his conviction under state law. (Timbs, supra, 230 L.Ed.2d at p. 15.) The Supreme Court agreed and unanimously ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines applies to the states under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at p. 17.) The Court noted that the Excessive Fines clause, which “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense” is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (Id. at pp. 17, 19, citations omitted.) The opinion also recognized that “fines may be employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’” (Id. at p. 18, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 979, fn. 9.)

Consistent with these constitutional protections, this bill would require the court to consider the defendant’s ability pay before imposition of any criminal fine, fee, and assessment.

1. Financial Implications for Criminal Defendants: ‷As legislative and other policy makers are becoming increasingly aware, the growing use of … fees and similar forms of criminal justice debt creates a significant barrier for individuals seeking to rebuild their lives after a criminal conviction. Criminal justice debt and associated collection practices can damage credit, interfere with a defendant's commitments, such as child support obligations, restrict employment opportunities and otherwise impede reentry and rehabilitation. “What at first glance appears to be easy money for the state can carry significant hidden costs—both human and financial—for individuals, for the government, and for the community at large. … Debt-related mandatory court appearances and probation and parole conditions leave debtors vulnerable for violations that result in a new form of debtor's prison. … Aggressive collection tactics can disrupt employment, make it difficult to meet other obligations such as child support, and lead to financial insecurity—all of which can lead to recidivism.” (Citation omitted.) These additional, potentially devastating consequences suffered only by indigent persons in effect transform a funding mechanism for the courts into additional punishment for a criminal conviction for those unable to pay.‴ (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168, quoting People v. Neal (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 820, 827.)
2. Growth of Uncollected Debt:  While criminal fines, fees, and penalties have climbed steadily, government entities tasked with collecting these fines have realized diminishing returns from collection efforts.  Government resources can be wasted in futile collection attempts.  A San Francisco Daily Journal article from several years ago noted, "When it comes to collecting fines, superior court officials in several counties describe the process as 'very frustrating,' 'crazy complicated' and 'inefficient.'"  (See State Judges Bemoan Fee Collection Process, San Francisco Daily Journal, 1/5/2015 by Paul Jones and Saul Sugarman.)
   
   Simply put, criminal defendants can generally not produce a substantial flow of money for fines.  That well will quickly run dry.  In the same Daily Journal article, the Presiding Judge of San Bernardino County was quoted as saying "the whole concept is getting blood out of a turnip." (Daily Journal, supra.) The article noted in particular that "Felons convicted to prison time usually can't pay their debts at all.  The annual growth in delinquent debt partly reflects a supply of money that doesn't exist to be collected."  (Ibid.)

In March of 2017, when the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) analyzed the Governor’s criminal fines and fees proposal for the 2017-2018 budget, it noted, “Based on available data in Judicial Council reports, the total amount of criminal fines and fees collected has declined annually since 2013-14. … [T]otal collections decreased by nearly $200 million—from $1.8 billion in 2013-14 to $1.6 billion in 2015-16. The $1.6 billion consists of about $905 million (56 percent) in debt that was not delinquent and $720 million (44 percent) in delinquent debt.” (See 2017-2018 Budget: Governor’s Criminal Fines and Fees Proposal, pp. 7-8, http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3600/Criminal-Fine-Fee-030317.pdf)

As to the balance of outstanding debt, the LAO commented, “Every year, the courts estimate the total outstanding balance of debt owed by individuals. This balance may decrease when individuals make payments or debt is resolve in an alternative manner, such as when a portion of debt is dismissed because the individual performs community service in lieu of payment. However, this amount generally grows each year as some amount of newly imposed fines and fees goes unpaid and is added to the amount of unresolved debt from prior years. … [A]n estimated $12.3 billion in fines and fees remained outstanding at the end of 2015-16. We would note, however, that a large portion of this balance may not be collectable as the costs of collection could outweigh the amount that would actually be collected.” (Id. at p. 8.)

1. Argument in Support: According to the California Public Defenders Association, “AB 927… serves to bring our criminal fine and assessment statutes into alignment with the state and federal constitutions. Indeed, in the recently published opinion in People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal found that imposition of court fines and fees on a defendant without inquiring into the defendant’s ability to pay violated state and federal constitutional guarantees. (Id. at p. 270.) As the Duenas court put it: ‘Because the only reason [the defendant] cannot pay the fine and fees is her poverty, using the criminal process to collect a fine she cannot pay is unconstitutional.’ (Ibid.) AB 927 will help ensure that people are not penalized specifically for being poor. ‘Whatever hardship poverty may cause in the society generally, the judicial process must make itself available to the indigent; it must free itself of sanctions born of financial inability.’ (Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 87-88.) AB 927 requires courts to take into account a defendant’s ability to pay court assessments, and in doing so frees our system from one particularly harmful sanction on the impoverished.”
   
2. Related Legislation:
   
   1. AB 227 (Jones-Sawyer), would authorize a court to waive imposition of a criminal conviction assessment fee, court operations assessment fee or restitution fine based on the court’s determination of the defendant’s ability to pay. AB 227 is pending hearing in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
      
   2. AB 1077 (Eggman), would establish a program incentive for collaborative courts whereby the court can suspend, reduce, and/or waive certain fines, as specified. AB 1077 will be heard in this Committee today.
      
   3. AB 1348 (Gray), would repeal the 20% state surcharge on base fines. AB 1348 is pending hearing in this Committee.
      
   4. SB 144 (Mitchell), would repeals various administrative fees that agencies and courts are authorized to impose to fund elements of the criminal legal system, and would eliminate all outstanding debt incurred as a result of the fees. SB 144 is pending referral by the Senate Rules Committee.
      
3. Prior Legislation:
   
   1. SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, Statutes of 2017, limits the authority of local agencies to assess and collect specified fees against persons subject to the juvenile delinquency system.
      
   2. SB 941 (Mitchell), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have repealed and limited authority to collect fees in juvenile cases. SB 941 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
      
   3. AB 898 (Alejo), Chapter 358, Statutes of 2011, increased the minimum restitution fine incrementally over a three-year period from $200 to $300 for a felony conviction and from $100 to $150 for a misdemeanor conviction.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association

National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter

NextGen California

Opposition

None

Analysis Prepared by:

Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744

1. The suspended license was the result of the inability to pay over $1000 arising from three juvenile citations. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161.) ↑

2. Amicus Curiae Los Angeles County Public Defender also argued that imposing a restitution fine without considering ability to pay also violates the prohibition on excessive fines. The Court of Appeal did not specifically address this claim, noting that the due process and excessive fines analysis are sufficiently similar that they reach the same result. (People v. Duenas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 1171, fn. 8.) ↑