SB 981: Criminal procedure: factual innocence.
- Session Year: 2021-2022
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2022-08-18
Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.
Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to, or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for such a writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.
This bill would require such notice to be given no less than seven days before entering a stipulation.
Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.
This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.
The bill would make other conforming changes.
Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.
Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to, or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for such a writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.
This bill would require such notice to be given no less than seven days before entering a stipulation.
Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.
This bill would instead grant a presumption of factual innocence for the purpose of obtaining that compensation, which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as established by the district attorney within specified time limitations, and subject to certain restrictions.This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.
The bill would make other conforming changes.
Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.
Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to, or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for such a writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.
This bill would require such notice to be given no less than seven days before entering a stipulation.
Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.
This bill would instead grant a presumption of factual innocence for the purpose of obtaining that compensation, which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as established by the district attorney within specified time limitations, and subject to certain restrictions.
The bill would make other conforming changes.
Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.
Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to, or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for such a writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.
This bill would require such notice to be given no less than seven days before entering a stipulation.
Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.
This bill would instead grant a presumption of factual innocence for the purpose of obtaining that compensation, which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as established by the district attorney. attorney within specified time limitations, and subject to certain restrictions.
The bill would make other conforming changes.
Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.
Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to, or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for such a writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.
This bill would require such notice to be given no less than seven days before entering a stipulation.
Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.
This bill would instead grant a presumption of factual innocence for the purpose of obtaining that compensation, which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as established by the district attorney.
The bill would make other conforming changes.
(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. A response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts rulings or orders.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner.
(c)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(d)(1)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to common law, the California Constitution, the United States Constitution, or paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, of subdivision (b) of Section 1473, or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, the petitioner may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3. The court shall issue a finding in favor of compensation unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the motion and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation. The district attorney shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense. The district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties.
(2)If the district attorney does not object, or if the district attorney fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense as described in paragraph (1), the court shall grant the motion and the board shall, upon application by the person, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(3)If the motion is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the district attorney, the duty of the board to, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature payment of the claim, shall apply.
(e)A conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the claimant is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation. The district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
(f)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). No res judicata or collateral estoppel finding in any other proceeding shall be made for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.
(g)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(h)For the purposes of this section, unless otherwise stated, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 4902 of the Penal Code is amended to read:4902.(a)If the provisions of Section 851.865 or 1485.55 apply in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim, calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum. As to any claim to which Section 851.865 or 1485.55 does not apply, the Attorney General shall respond to the claim within 60 days or request an extension of time, upon a showing of good cause.
(b)Upon receipt of a response from the Attorney General, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing. The board shall use reasonable diligence in setting the date for the hearing and shall attempt to set the date for the hearing at the earliest date convenient for the parties and the board.
(c)If the time period for response elapses without a request for extension or a response from the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a), the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, mail notice thereof to the claimant at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing, and make a recommendation based on the claimants verified claim and any evidence presented by the claimant.
(d)If subdivision (b) of Section 4900 applies in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum, unless the Attorney General objects in writing, within 45 days from when the claimant files the claim, with clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. The Attorney General may request a single 45-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney Generals office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for the review. If the Attorney General declines to object within the allotted period of time, then the board shall issue its recommendation pursuant to Section 4904 within 60 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the objection, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the fixed time for the hearing. At a hearing, the Attorney General shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts constituting the offense. If the Attorney General fails to meet this burden, the board shall recommend to the Legislature payment of the compensation sum calculated pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. A response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts rulings or orders.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence. If the district attorney or the court has dismissed the charges against the person or the person has been acquitted on retrial, there exists a presumption in favor of a finding of factual innocence for purposes of eligibility for compensation, unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the petition and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3. The district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner.
(c)If the district attorney does not object, or the court makes a finding that the district attorney has not overcome the presumption described in subdivision (b), the court shall grant to motion and the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.(c)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(d)(1)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to common law, the California Constitution, the United States Constitution, or paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, of subdivision (b) of Section 1473, or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, the petitioner may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3. The court shall issue a finding in favor of compensation unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the motion and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation. The district attorney shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense. The district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties.
(2)If the district attorney does not object, or if the district attorney fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense as described in paragraph (1), the court shall grant the motion and the board shall, upon application by the person, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(3)If the motion is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the district attorney, the duty of the board to, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature payment of the claim, shall apply.
(d)(e)A conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the claimant is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation. The district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
(e)(f)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). No res judicata or collateral estoppel finding in any other proceeding shall be made for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.
(f)(g)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(g)(h)For the purposes of this section, unless otherwise stated, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 4902 of the Penal Code is amended to read:4902.(a)If the provisions of Section 851.865 or 1485.55 apply in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim, calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum. As to any claim to which Section 851.865 or 1485.55 does not apply, the Attorney General shall respond to the claim within 60 days or request an extension of time, upon a showing of good cause.
(b)Upon receipt of a response from the Attorney General, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing. The board shall use reasonable diligence in setting the date for the hearing and shall attempt to set the date for the hearing at the earliest date convenient for the parties and the board.
(c)If the time period for response elapses without a request for extension or a response from the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a), the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, mail notice thereof to the claimant at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing, and make a recommendation based on the claimants verified claim and any evidence presented by the claimant.
(d)If subdivision (b) of Section 4900 applies in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum, unless the Attorney General objects in writing, within 45 days from when the claimant files the claim, with clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. The Attorney General may request a single 45-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney Generals office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for the review. If the Attorney General declines to object within the allotted period of time, then the board shall issue its recommendation pursuant to Section 4904 within 60 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the objection, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the fixed time for the hearing. At a hearing, the Attorney General shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts constituting the offense. If the Attorney General fails to meet this burden, the board shall recommend to the Legislature payment of the compensation sum calculated pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. A response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts rulings or orders.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence. If the district attorney or the court has dismissed the charges against the person or the person has been acquitted on retrial, there exists a presumption in favor of a finding of factual innocence for purposes of eligibility for compensation, unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the petition and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3. The district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties.
(c)If the district attorney does not object, or the court makes a finding that the district attorney has not overcome the presumption described in subdivision (b), the court shall grant to motion and the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(d)A conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the claimant is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation. The district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). No res judicata or collateral estoppel finding in any other proceeding shall be made for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(g)For the purposes of this section, unless otherwise stated, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 4902 of the Penal Code is amended to read:4902.(a)If the provisions of Section 851.865 or 1485.55 apply in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim, calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum. As to any claim to which Section 851.865 or 1485.55 does not apply, the Attorney General shall respond to the claim within 60 days or request an extension of time, upon a showing of good cause.
(b)Upon receipt of a response from the Attorney General, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing. The board shall use reasonable diligence in setting the date for the hearing and shall attempt to set the date for the hearing at the earliest date convenient for the parties and the board.
(c)If the time period for response elapses without a request for extension or a response from the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a), the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, mail notice thereof to the claimant at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing, and make a recommendation based on the claimants verified claim and any evidence presented by the claimant.
(d)If subdivision (b) of Section 4900 applies in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum, unless the Attorney General objects in writing, within 45 days from when the claimant files the claim, with clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. The Attorney General may request a single 45-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney Generals office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for the review. If the Attorney General declines to object within the allotted period of time, then the board shall issue its recommendation pursuant to Section 4904 within 60 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the objection, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the fixed time for the hearing. At a hearing, the Attorney General shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts constituting the offense. If the Attorney General fails to meet this burden, the board shall recommend to the Legislature payment of the compensation sum calculated pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. A response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts rulings or orders.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, when the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence. If the district attorney or the court has dismissed the charges against the person or the person has been acquitted on retrial, there exists a presumption in favor of a finding of factual innocence for purposes of eligibility for compensation, unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the petition and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3. The district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties.
(c)If the district attorney does not object, or the court makes a finding that the district attorney has not overcome the presumption described in subdivision (b), the court shall grant to motion and the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(d)A conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the claimant is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation. The district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
(d)(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). No res judicata or collateral estoppel finding in any other proceeding shall be made for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.
(e)(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(f)(g)For the purposes of this section, unless otherwise stated, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 4902 of the Penal Code is amended to read:4902.(a)If the provisions of Section 851.865 or 1485.55 apply in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim, calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum. As to any claim to which Section 851.865 or 1485.55 does not apply, the Attorney General shall respond to the claim within 60 days or request an extension of time, upon a showing of good cause.
(b)Upon receipt of a response from the Attorney General, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing. The board shall use reasonable diligence in setting the date for the hearing and shall attempt to set the date for the hearing at the earliest date convenient for the parties and the board.
(c)If the time period for response elapses without a request for extension or a response from the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a), the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, mail notice thereof to the claimant at least 15 days prior to the time fixed for the hearing, and make a recommendation based on the claimants verified claim and any evidence presented by the claimant.
(d)If subdivision (b) of Section 4900 applies in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum, unless the Attorney General objects in writing, within 45 days from when the claimant files the claim, with clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. The Attorney General may request a single 45-day extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. An extension of time beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. If the Attorney General declines to object within the allotted period of time, then the board shall issue its recommendation pursuant to Section 4904 within 60 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the objection, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim, and shall mail notice thereof to the claimant and to the Attorney General at least 15 days prior to the fixed time for the hearing. At a hearing, the Attorney General shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts constituting the offense. If the Attorney General fails to meet this burden, the board shall recommend to the Legislature payment of the compensation sum calculated pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. A response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts rulings or orders.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner. innocence. If the district attorney or the court has dismissed the charges against the person or the person has been acquitted on retrial, there exists a presumption in favor of a finding of factual innocence for purposes of eligibility for compensation, unless the district attorney objects and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 4900) of Title 6 of Part 3.
(c)If the district attorney does not object, or the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to district attorney has not overcome the presumption described in subdivision (b), the court shall grant to motion and the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(d)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). No res judicata or collateral estoppel finding in any other proceeding shall be made for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.
(e)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(f)For the purposes of this section, unless otherwise stated, court is defined as a state or federal court.
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Sep 29, 2022 | In Senate. Consideration of Governor's veto pending. |
| Sep 29, 2022 | Vetoed by the Governor. |
| Aug 23, 2022 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 12:30 p.m. |
| Aug 16, 2022 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 37. Noes 0. Page 4849.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 4, 2022 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Aug 4, 2022 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 76. Noes 0. Page 5756.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Jun 30, 2022 | Read second time. Ordered to consent calendar. |
| Jun 29, 2022 | From committee: Do pass. Ordered to consent calendar. (Ayes 14. Noes 0.) (June 29). |
| Jun 6, 2022 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 2, 2022 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To consent calendar. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (June 1). |
| May 5, 2022 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 28, 2022 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Apr 28, 2022 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 37. Noes 0. Page 3555.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Apr 26, 2022 | Read second time. Ordered to consent calendar. |
| Apr 25, 2022 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8 and ordered to consent calendar. |
| Apr 18, 2022 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 14, 2022 | Set for hearing April 25. |
| Apr 13, 2022 | April 18 hearing postponed by committee. |
| Apr 5, 2022 | Set for hearing April 18. |
| Mar 29, 2022 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR with recommendation: To consent calendar. (Ayes 5. Noes 0. Page 3255.) (March 29). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 23, 2022 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 3, 2022 | Set for hearing March 29. |
| Feb 23, 2022 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Feb 11, 2022 | From printer. |
| Feb 10, 2022 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
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Date
|
Description
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Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 16, 2022 | Unfinished Business SB981 Glazer et al. Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 4, 2022 | SB 981 Glazer Consent Calendar Second Day Regular Session | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 28, 2022 | Consent Calendar SB981 | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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Bill Author
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