Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.

Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for the writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.

This bill would require that notice to be given no less than 7 days before entering a stipulation.

Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.

This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.

Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation Board to recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid, as specified, to a person who has secured a declaration of factual innocence from the court and has applied to the board for compensation, as specified.

This bill would instead require the board to approve payment to the person if sufficient funds are available and funds are appropriated by the Legislature for that purpose.

Existing law requires the board to calculate the compensation for injury sustained because of erroneous conviction and imprisonment based on factual innocence and approve payment to a claimant, as specified, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim to the board, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

This bill would instead require the calculation within 90 days of the filing of the claim. The bill would authorize the board, prior to approving payment, to request from both parties additional documents or arguments as needed to calculate compensation.

The bill would make other conforming changes.

Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.

Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for the writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.

This bill would require that notice to be given no less than 7 days before entering a stipulation.

Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.

This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.

Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation Board to recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid, as specified, to a person who has secured a declaration of factual innocence from the court and has applied to the board for compensation, as specified.

This bill would instead require the board to approve payment to the person if sufficient funds are available and funds are appropriated by the Legislature for that purpose.

Existing law requires the board to calculate the compensation for injury sustained because of erroneous conviction and imprisonment based on factual innocence and approve payment to a claimant, as specified, within 30 days of the presentation of the claim to the board, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

This bill would instead require the calculation within 90 days of the filing of the claim. The bill would authorize the board, prior to approving payment, to request from both parties additional documents or arguments as needed to calculate compensation.

The bill would make other conforming changes.

Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.

Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for the writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.

This bill would require that notice to be given no less than 7 days before entering a stipulation.

Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.

This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.

The bill would make other conforming changes.

Existing law authorizes a person who is unlawfully imprisoned under specified circumstances, including, without limitation, conviction on the basis of false evidence or the existence of new exculpatory evidence, to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. Existing law also authorizes such a person who is no longer in custody to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment.

Under existing law, if the district attorney stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying the application for the writ or motion, the district attorney is required to provide notice to the Attorney General.

This bill would require that notice to be given no less than 7 days before entering a stipulation.

Under existing law, if a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate a judgment is granted for specified reasons, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained through the erroneous conviction and incarceration.

This bill would authorize a person, if the court has granted specified writs of habeas corpus and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation. The bill would require the court to grant that motion unless the district attorney can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation, as specified.

The bill would make other conforming changes.

 UNFINISHED BUSINESS  

Bill No: SB 78

Author: Glazer (D), et al.

Amended: 6/6/23

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-0, 3/28/23

AYES: Wahab, Ochoa Bogh, Bradford, Skinner, Wiener

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8

SENATE FLOOR: 37-0, 5/4/23 (Consent)

AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Atkins, Becker, Bradford, Caballero, Cortese, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Eggman, Glazer, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, McGuire, Menjivar, Min, Newman, Nguyen, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto, Skinner, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Wiener, Wilk

NO VOTE RECORDED: Blakespear, Gonzalez, Limón

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 79-0, 8/31/23 (Consent) - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: factual innocence

SOURCE: California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project

California Innocence Project

Loyola Project for the Innocent

DIGEST:

This bill allows a person to petition a court for a finding that they are entitled to wrongful conviction compensation, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, and the charges against the person were dismissed or the person was acquitted on retrial.

Assembly Amendments

require the California Victims Compensation Board to approve the payment to a person declared to be factually innocent, if the funds are available; provide that the calculation for payment for injury resulting from an erroneous conviction occur within 90 days instead of 30 days and allows the California Victims Compensation Board to ask for additional information; and make a number of technical amendments.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Establishes procedures for the filing and hearing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which allows a person to challenge their incarceration or related restraint as unlawful. (Penal Code §§ 1474-1508.)
2. States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
3. False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration;
4. False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; or,
5. New evidence, as defined, exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. (Penal Code § 1473 (b).)
6. Authorizes a person no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment for any of the following reasons:
7. Newly discovered evidence of fraud by a government official that completely undermines the prosecution’s case, is conclusive, and points unerringly to his or her innocence;
8. Newly discovered evidence that a government official testified falsely at the trial that resulted in the conviction and that the testimony of the government official was substantially probative on the issue of guilt or punishment; or,
9. Newly discovered evidence of misconduct by a government official committed in the underlying case that resulted in fabrication of evidence that was substantially material and probative on the issue of guilt or punishment. Evidence of misconduct in other cases is not sufficient to warrant relief under this paragraph. (Penal Code § 1473.6(a).)
10. Authorizes a person who is no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence when newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice. (Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(2).)
11. States that whenever a person is convicted of a charge, and the conviction is set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge, the judge shall order that the records in the case be sealed, including any record of arrest or detention, upon written or oral motion of any party in the case or the court, and with notice to all parties to the case. (Penal Code § 851.86.)
12. Requires the court to inform a person whose conviction has been set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge of the availability of indemnity for persons erroneously convicted and the time limitations for presenting those claims to the California Victim Compensation Board (“board”). (Penal Code § 4900.)
13. Provides that after a writ of habeas was granted and the charges are subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges, the board, shall up0on application by the person, without a hearing, recommend to the legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid, unless the Attorney General establishes that the person is not entitled to compensation. (Penal Code § 4900 (b))
14. States that if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence, the finding shall be sufficient grounds for compensation by the board. Upon application, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made. (Penal Code § 851.865.)
15. Provides that if the district attorney or the Attorney General (AG) stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgement, the facts underlying the basis for the court’s ruling shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a).
16. States that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c).)
17. Provides that the district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the judgement. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (b).)
18. States that, in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgement, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that the finding shall be binding on the board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (a).)
19. Provides that, in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, as specified, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (b).)
20. States that if the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55, (c).)
21. Provides that if a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than preponderance of the evidence, the board shall without a hearing recommend the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55)
22. Provides that the Attorney General has 60 days to respond to any claim for which the board has recommended to the Legislature that a claim be paid and for which the person was not declared factually innocent. (Penal Code § 4902(a))
23. Provides that in cases where a person was acquitted or the charges were dismissed after a habeas petition was granted, the Attorney General may object to a claim in writing within 45 days and may request a single 45 day extension. (Penal Code § 4902(d))

This bill:

1. Provides that if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence the finding shall be binding on the California Victims Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board and that without a hearing the payment should be approved, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation of the Legislature.
2. Provides that the notice from the district attorney to the Attorney General shall be no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
3. Provides that a response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
4. Provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature the payment be made, the board shall approve the payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
5. Provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature, the board shall approve payment of the claim if funds are available, upon appropriation of the Legislature.
6. Provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if a state has granted a writ of habeas corpus, or vacated a judgement, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, the petition may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation.
7. Provides that the court shall issue a finding in favor of compensation unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the motion and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore entitled to compensation.
8. Provides that the district attorney shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that het person committed the acts constituting the offense. The district attorney may request a single 30 day extension of time upon a showing of good cause and a further extension of time may be given if agreed upon by both parties.
9. Provides that if the district attorney does not object, or if the district attorney fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense, the court shall grant the motion and the board shall, upon application by the person, without a hearing, approve of payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
10. Provides that if the motion is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the district attorney, the duty of the board to without a hearing, approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature shall apply.
11. Provides that if a conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that he claimant is guilty of a crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through litigation, or that there was conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
12. Provides that the district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
13. Provides that if a federal court after granting a writ of habeas corpus finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence the board without a hearing shall approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
14. Provides that an extension beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney General’s office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for review.
15. Provides that before approving a claim for a person found to be factually innocent, the California Victims Compensation Board, before approving payment, may request additional documents from both parties if needed to calculate compensation.

Background

According to the author:

The signing of SB 446 into law created a more just and equitable compensation process by transferring the responsibility of proof from the wrongfully convicted individual to the Attorney General in compensation proceedings in front of the Victim’s Compensation Board (VCB).

Individuals who have claimed compensation are granted the presumption of innocence by law if their conviction has been overturned. Current law requires the Attorney General to object to only those claims in which they believe the person should not be compensated. If the Attorney General chooses to object to the individual’s claim, there must be sufficient, clear, and concise evidence proving the decision to not grant compensation.

However, while SB 446 constructed a fair shift to the Attorney General’s office in compensation proceedings in front of the VCB, the law did not allocate the burden to the District Attorney’s office if a wrongfully convicted person instead chose to pursue the existing process through the court.

This oversight has unintentionally tipped the scales to create a more fair and efficient process in the VCB than the courts. The potential for incentivizing wrongfully convicted individuals to go through the VCB rather than the courts, likely places an unbalanced burden on the Attorney General’s office to handle these cases rather than them being equitably distributed through the processes.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No

According to Assembly Appropriations Committee, costs (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown amount to the courts to adjudicate motions authorized by this bill. Actual costs to the courts will depend on the number of motions filed, the number of motions to which a district attorney objects, and the amount of court time needed for each hearing. It generally costs about $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. The VCB reported receiving 28 claims in 2021 and 39 claims in 2022. Even if this bill generates 30 to 40 related motions annually – a high estimate – total court costs would likely be less than $150,000.

SUPPORT: (Verified 8/31/23)

California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project (co-source)

California Innocence Project (co-source)

Loyola Project for The Innocent (co-source)

ACLU California Action

California Public Defenders Association

Californians United for A Responsible Budget

Ella Baker Center for Human Rights

Initiate Justice

Legal Services for Prisoners With Children

National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter

Prosecutors Alliance California

San Francisco Public Defender

Smart Justice California

University of San Francisco School of Law | Racial Justice Clinic

OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/31/23)

None received

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the sponsors:

To receive compensation for years lost to wrongful incarceration, exonerated persons choose whether to pursue compensation proceedings in (1) a Superior Court where they litigate against the District Attorney or (B) at the Victim’s Compensation Board where they litigate against the Attorney General. Thus, after a court has already found that an individual was wrongfully convicted by the State, their conviction has been reversed and the State has dismissed the charges or the person was acquitted after a retrial and that individual is now cloaked with the presumption of innocence, the individual must then, through additional litigation, show that they are innocent in order to obtain compensation. The claims process involves lengthy litigation and inconsistent results, leaving many wrongfully convicted citizens without compensation.

Last year, the Legislature came together to reform one of California’s two compensation forums, making the process more efficient, consistent, and just for the wrongfully convicted. Representing an important first step in ameliorating this burdensome system, SB 446 enacted important changes to the VCB’s compensation proceedings: the legislation shifted the burden of proof from the wrongly convicted person to the Attorney General. When arguing in front of the VCB, the Attorney General now must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. Unfortunately, however, SB 446 neglected to make the same changes to the compensation process in Superior Courts.

SB 78 extends the spirit of SB 446; it would make the same change to compensation proceedings in the Superior Courts by shifting the burden to the District Attorney to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. SB 981 merely ensures that both paths for pursuing compensation are consistent so as to not unduly burden one representative of the State and to make the process fair and just for the wrongfully convicted in both arenas.

SB 78 will bring consistency to California’s two compensation systems. Consistency in this case is important both for exonerated individuals as well as for the systems they navigate – if SB 78 is not passed, most wrongly convicted individuals will file for compensation through the VCB process, straining VCB and the Attorney General’s resources in ways that will likely create additional delays and costs.

The wrongfully convicted have lost years of their lives due to their incarceration and years in litigation proving their innocence in the Courts. These individuals deserve to be compensated by a system that is not only just but also efficient – for as the timeworn maxim goes: Justice delayed is justice denied. SB 78 is being run again in 2023 as some language in SB 981 for 2022 was chaptered out by the 2022 budget bill.

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 79-0, 8/31/23

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Cervantes, Chen, Connolly, Megan Dahle, Davies, Dixon, Essayli, Flora, Mike Fong, Vince Fong, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Holden, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, Mathis, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Rendon, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Villapudua, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Robert Rivas

NO VOTE RECORDED: McCarty

Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /

8/31/23 16:18:06

**** END ****

Date of Hearing: August 23, 2023

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Chris Holden, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 78

Author:(Glazer) – As Amended Ver:June 6, 2023

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No

SUMMARY:

This bill allows a person to petition a court for a finding that they are entitled to wrongful conviction compensation, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, and the charges against the person were dismissed or the person was acquitted on retrial.

Specifically, among other provisions, this bill:

1. Provides that, if the court granted a person’s writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment against them, and the charges against the person were dismissed or the person was acquitted on retrial, the person may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to approval of a claim for wrongful conviction compensation.
2. Requires the court to grant the motion, unless the district attorney objects to the motion and establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to wrongful conviction compensation.
3. Provides that, if the motion is granted, upon application by the person, the California Victim Compensation Board (VCB), shall without a hearing, approve wrongful conviction compensation payment to the person, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

FISCAL EFFECT:

Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown amount to the courts to adjudicate motions authorized by this bill. Actual costs to the courts will depend on the number of motions filed, the number of motions to which a district attorney objects, and the amount of court time needed for each hearing. It generally costs about $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. The VCB reported receiving 28 claims in 2021 and 39 claims in 2022. Even if this bill generates 30 to 40 related motions annually – a high estimate – total court costs would likely be less than $150,000.

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. According to the author:

The signing of SB 446 into law created a more just and equitable compensation process by transferring the responsibility of proof from the wrongfully convicted individual to the Attorney General in compensation proceedings that proceed in front of the Victim’s Compensation Board. Individuals who have claimed compensation are granted the presumption of innocence by law if their conviction has been overturned. Current law requires the Attorney General to object to only those claims in which they believe the person should not be compensated. If the Attorney General chooses to object to the individual’s claim, there must be sufficient, clear, and concise evidence proving the decision to not grant compensation.

However, while SB 446 constructed a fair shift to the Attorney General’s office in compensation proceedings in front of the VCB, the law did not allocate the burden to the District Attorney’s office if a wrongfully convicted person instead chose to pursue the existing process through the court. This oversight has unintentionally tipped the scales to a more fair and efficient process in the VCB rather than having the same fair and efficient process in the court. The potential for incentivizing wrongfully convicted individuals to go through the VCB rather than the courts, likely places an unbalanced burden on the Attorney General’s office to handle these cases rather than them being equitably distributed through the processes.

1. Background. Current law allows an individual whose conviction is reversed, and who meets certain requirements, to submit a claim to the VCB for compensation from the state for their improper imprisonment. If the VCB approves the exonerated person’s claim, they are entitled to compensation from the state of up to $140 per day of their incarceration. The VCB has approved compensation claims for 68 individuals in California since 2000.

A person who was erroneously convicted (the “claimant”) can take two paths to seek compensation from the VCB. If a court made a finding that the claimant was factually innocent, the claimant can submit a copy of the court order to the VCB and the VCB must provide compensation to the claimant within 30 days. If the court does not independently make such a finding, current procedure allows a person whose habeas petition is granted or judgment is vacated to file a motion asking the court to make a finding of factual innocence. Once the claimant has a finding from the court, the VCB does not need to conduct a hearing; the court’s finding of factual innocence is sufficient grounds for the VCB to approve a compensation claim.

Alternatively, if the claimant does not have a court finding of factual innocence, they can submit a claim to the VCB but the Attorney General (AG) has an opportunity to contest the claim. If the AG objects to the claim, the VCB sets a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, the AG must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the offense of which they were convicted and therefore the claimant is not entitled to compensation. If the AG cannot meet this burden of proof, the VCB must approve payment to the claimant.

This bill provides another way for a person who has not obtained a finding of factual innocence in court to obtain compensation from the VCB without having a hearing by the VCB. Under the bill, if the court has granted a claimant’s habeas petition or vacated the judgment against them, the claimant can file a motion asking the court to make a finding that the claimant is entitled to approval of a claim of wrongful conviction compensation. This is not technically the same as a court finding of factual innocence, but under this bill each of these findings would have the same ultimate effect – allowing the VCB to approve a claim for compensation without holding a hearing. If the claimant moves for a finding that they are entitled to wrongful conviction compensation, the district attorney has an opportunity to object and present evidence to counter the claim. If the district attorney cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the offense and is not entitled to compensation, the court must grant the claimant’s motion.

This bill is substantially similar to SB 981 (Glazer), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, which passed with bipartisan support. However, SB 981 contained provisions that conflicted with a VCB payment process established by the 2022 Budget bills. For that reason, Governor Newsom vetoed SB 981, writing that he “look[ed] forward to the author submitting a new bill next year on this issue.” SB 78 addresses the Governor’s concerns and is consistent with the current VCB payment process.

The VCB believes this bill will significantly increase the number of compensation claims submitted to the board, causing a corresponding increase in its workload. The VCB reports SB 446 (Glazer), Chapter 449, Statutes of 2021, resulted in roughly a 40% increase in claims submitted to and approved by the VCB. However, SB 446 shifted the burden of proof in compensation claims from the claimant to the AG – a major change that significantly increased the likelihood that a claimant will prevail if their claim has merit. In contrast, this bill makes a relatively minor procedural change that gives the court discretion over whether to make a finding that leads to compensation by the VCB. It is not clear that this bill would result in an influx of motions to the court or applications to the VCB, and the VCB may even experience modest savings to the extent some cases are handled in court rather than through VCB hearings.

Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing: June 13, 2023

Counsel: Liah Burnley

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 78

Author:(Glazer) – As Amended Ver:June 6, 2023

SUMMARY: Authorizes a person to move the court for a finding that they are entitled to approval of a claim for wrongful conviction compensation. Specifically, this bill:

1. Provides that, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, and the charges against the person have been dismissed or the person has been acquitted on retrial, the person may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to approval of a claim for wrongful conviction compensation.
   
2. Requires the court to grant the motion, unless the district attorney objects to the motion within 15 days, and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to wrongful conviction compensation.
3. States that a conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the person is guilty of the crime, that the state defended the conviction, or that there was a conviction to establish that the person is not entitled to wrongful conviction compensation. The district attorney may not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the person is not entitled to wrongful conviction compensation.
   
4. Provides that the district attorney may request a single 30-day extension of time upon a showing of good cause to object to the motion, and an extension beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between parties.
5. Requires the court to grant the motion if the district attorney does not object or if the district attorney fails to meet its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the offense.
   
6. Provides that, if the motion is granted, upon application by the person, the California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB), shall without a hearing, approve wrongful conviction compensation payment to the person, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
   
7. States that the district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General (AG) no fewer than seven days prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the judgement. Clarifies that a response from the AG is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
   
8. Extends the deadline for CalVCB to calculate compensation and approve wrongful conviction compensation payment from 30 days to 90 days.
   
9. Allows the AG to request an extension of the 45-day deadline to object to specified applications for wrongful conviction compensation before CalVCB. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for an additional 45-day extension upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the AG’s office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for the review.
   
10. Extends the deadline for CalVCB to approve payment from 60 days to 90 days, for claims for wrongful conviction compensation where the AG is authorized, but declines to object.
    
11. Allows CalVCB to request additional documents or arguments from both parties as needed to calculate wrongful conviction compensation payments.
    
12. Makes technical and conforming changes that delete the requirement that CalVCB recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim for of wrongful compensation be paid, and instead requires CalVCB to approve payment of wrongful compensation claims, as specified, if sufficient funds are available upon appropriation by the Legislature.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Provides that, in any case where a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading has been filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the person may, at any time after dismissal, petition the court for a declaration of factual innocence, as specified. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.8, subds. (b)-(d), 851.86.)
2. Provides that, if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence from the court the finding shall be sufficient grounds for payment of wrongful conviction compensation. Upon application by the person, CalVCB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim be paid, as specified. If a declaration of factual innocence is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the prosecutor, CalVCB has a duty to, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature payment of the claim. (Pen. Code, § 851.865.)
3. Provides that if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence from the court, then CalVCB shall, within 30 days of presentation of the claim for wrongful conviction compensation, approve payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (a).)
   
4. Authorizes a person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
   
   1. False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against the person at a hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration;
      
   2. False physical evidence, believed by the person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person;
      
   3. New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial; or,
      
   4. A significant dispute has emerged or further developed in the person’s favor regarding expert medical, scientific, or forensic testimony that was introduced at trial and contributed to the conviction, such that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. (Pen. Code, § 1473.)
      
5. Authorizes a person no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment if there is:
   
   1. Newly discovered evidence of fraud by a government official the completely undermines the prosecution’s case points unerringly to the person’s innocence;
      
   2. Newly discovered evidence that a government official testified falsely at the trial that resulted in the conviction and was substantially probative on the issue of guilt or punishment; or,
      
   3. There is newly discovered evidence of misconduct by a government official that resulted in fabrication of evidence that was substantially material and probative on the issue of guilt or punishment. (Pen. Code, § 1473.6.)
      
6. Authorizes a person who is no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence where newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (a)(2).)
   
7. Provides that if the district attorney or the AG stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate, the facts underlying the basis for the court’s ruling shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and CalVCB. (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.5, subd. (a).)
   
8. Provides that the district attorney shall provide notice to the AG prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate. (Pen. Code, § 1485.5, subd. (b).)
   
9. States that the express factual findings made by the court in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and CalVCB. (Pen. Code, §§1485.5, subd. (c), 4903, subd. (c).)
   
10. Provides that, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment, and the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the CalVCB for a claim presented to it for wrongful conviction compensation, and upon application by the person, CalVCB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim for wrongful conviction compensation be paid, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subd. (a).)
    
11. Provides that if a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment , and the court has found that the person is factually innocent, CalVCB shall, within 30 days of presentation of the claim for wrongful conviction compensation, approve payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (a).)
12. Provides that, if a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the person. If the court makes a finding that the person has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, CalVCB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim for wrongful conviction compensation be paid, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subds. (b), (c).)
    
13. Provides that if a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, and the court makes a finding that the person has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, CalVCB shall, within 30 days of presentation of the claim for wrongful conviction compensation, approve payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (a).)
14. Provides that, if a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus finds the person factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the person, CalVCB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim for wrongful conviction compensation be paid. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subd. (e).)
    
15. Provides that, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment, and the court has not found that the person is factually innocent, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, CalVCB shall, upon application by the person, and without a hearing, approve payment for wrongful conviction compensation, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature, unless the AG objects in writing, within 45 days from when the person files the claim. Upon receipt of the objection, CalVCB shall set a hearing on the claim, as specified. At the hearing, the AG bears the burden of establishing with clear and convincing evidence that the person is not entitled to compensation and that the person committed the offense. The person may introduce evidence in support of their claim. (Pen. Code, §§ 4900, subd. (b), 4902, subd. (d), & 4903, subd. (b).)
    
16. States that a conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the AG may not rely on the fact at the hearing before CalVCB that the state still maintains that the person is guilty of the crime, that the state defended the conviction through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the person is not entitled to compensation. The AG may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the person is not entitled to compensation. (Pen. Code, § 4903, subd. (d).)
    
17. Requires, if the evidence shows that person did not commit the offense, or if the AG has not met the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person committee the offense, and CalVCB has found that the person sustained injury through their erroneous conviction and imprisonment, CalVCB to approve payment for wrongful conviction compensation if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4904, subd. (a).)
    
18. Sets the amount of the payment for wrongful conviction compensation at $140 per day of incarceration served, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 4904, subd. (a).)
    

FISCAL EFFECT:

COMMENTS:

1. Author's Statement: According to the author, “The signing of SB 446 into law created a more just and equitable compensation process by transferring the responsibility of proof from the wrongfully convicted individual to the Attorney General in compensation proceedings that proceed in front of the Victim’s Compensation Board. Individuals who have claimed compensation are granted the presumption of innocence by law if their conviction has been overturned. Current law requires the Attorney General to object to only those claims in which they believe the person should not be compensated. If the Attorney General chooses to object to the individual’s claim, there must be sufficient, clear, and concise evidence proving the decision to not grant compensation.
   

“However, while SB 446 constructed a fair shift to the Attorney General’s office in compensation proceedings in front of the VCB, the law did not allocate the burden to the District Attorney’s office if a wrongfully convicted person instead chose to pursue the existing process through the court.

“This oversight has unintentionally tipped the scales to a more fair and efficient process in the VCB rather than having the same fair and efficient process in the court. The potential for incentivizing wrongfully convicted individuals to go through the VCB rather than the courts, likely places an unbalanced burden on the Attorney General’s office to handle these cases rather than them being equitably distributed through the processes.”

1. Wrongful Conviction Compensation: Proponents have characterized this bill as creating parity between “California’s two compensation systems.” However, California does not have two compensation systems. Pursuant to Penal Code sections 4900 through 4906, CalVCB is the sole agency responsible for processing claims from persons seeking compensation for wrongful convictions. The amount of the payment is $140 per day of incarceration served. (Pen. Code, § 4904, subd. (a); see also CalVCB, Claims for Erroneously Convicted Persons <https://victims.ca.gov/legal/pc4900/> [June 1, 2023].)

Whether CalVCB will process a claim without a hearing depends on if a court has found the person factually innocent. If the person has first obtained a declaration of factual innocence from a court, this finding is binding on the CalVCB. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.86, 851.865, 4902, subd. (a)). No hearing is required; the finding is sufficient grounds for payment of compensation. (Ibid.) Similarly, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, and in either of those proceedings found that the person is factually innocent, the finding is binding on the CalVCB and is sufficient grounds for payment of compensation without a hearing. (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.55, subd. (a), 4902, subd. (a).) Additionally, a person who has had a writ of habeas corpus granted or their judgment vacated can move the court for a finding of factual innocence prior to submitting a compensation claim to CalVCB. (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.55, subd. (b).) In this instance, the person has the burden in court to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not commit the crime. (Ibid.) If the court grants the motion and finds the person factually innocent, the finding is binding on CalVCB and is sufficient grounds for payment of compensation without a hearing. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (a).) Otherwise put, “a recommendation for compensation [by CalVCB is] automatically mandated without a hearing and within 30 days, if a court has found the claimant to be factually innocent of the challenged conviction. (CalVCB, Claims for Erroneously Convicted Persons <https://victims.ca.gov/legal/pc4900/> [June 1, 2023].)

Alternatively, for all other claims, CalVCB may be required to hold a hearing. (Pen. Code, § 4900, subd. (a).) In claims where a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate, but the court did not find the person factually innocent, CalVCB is required to, without a hearing, approve payment to the claimant if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature, unless the AG objects to the claim. (Pen. Code, §§ 4900 subd. (b), 4902, subd. (d), 4903, subd. (b).) Upon receipt of the AG’s objection, CalVCB must set a hearing of the claim (Ibid.) At a hearing, the AG bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the offense, and is therefore not entitled to wrongful conviction compensation. (Ibid.) If the AG fails to meet this burden, CalVCB is required approve payment, if sufficient funds are available upon appropriation by the Legislature. (Ibid.) “[A] recommendation for compensation is required absent clear and convincing proof of the claimant’s guilt.” (CalVCB, Claims for Erroneously Convicted Persons <https://victims.ca.gov/legal/pc4900/> [June 1, 2023].)

This bill would create an additional pathway for individuals who did not obtain a finding of factual innocence in court, to get wrongful conviction compensation from CalVCB without a hearing at CalVCB. Specifically, this bill would allow, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, the person may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to approval of a claim for wrongful conviction compensation. If the court grants the motion, the finding would be binding on CalVCB, and upon application, CalVCB would be required to approve payment the claim, without holding a hearing. In so doing, this bill would allow individuals who have had their convictions overturned, but have not been found factually innocent by the court, to choose to litigate their entitlement to wrongful conviction compensation in court or at CalVCB. In either case, the person would still be required to apply to CalVCB for payment of the claim.

1. Parity with SB 466 (Glazer): SB 446 (Glazer), Chapter 490, Statues of 2021, which passed the Legislature with bipartisan support, changed the process within CalVCB related to hearings for wrongful conviction compensation claims by shifting the burden onto the AG to prove that the person is not entitled to compensation.
   
   As discussed above, this bill would create an additional route for individuals to obtain wrongful conviction compensation in cases where their conviction has been overturned, but the court has not issued a finding of factual innocence. This bill would authorize these individuals to choose to litigate the issue of their entitlement to wrongful conviction compensation in court against the district attorney, instead of against the AG before CalVCB. This bill puts similar requirements on the district attorney litigating the matter in court, as the requirements SB 446 put on the AG litigating the matter before CalVCB. Specifically, this bill includes the following:
   
   • • • This bill requires the court to grant the motion, unless the district attorney objects within 15 days. In comparison, SB 446 required CalVCB to approve the claim unless the AG objects within 45 days. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (d).)
         
       • This bill requires the district attorney to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the offense. In comparison, SB 446 provided that the AG must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the offense. (Pen. Code, § 4902, subd. (d).)
         
       • This bill requires the court to grant the motion if district attorney fails to meet its burden. This bill further provides that if the motion is granted, upon application, CalVCB is required to approve the claim for wrongful conviction compensation. In comparison, SB 446 provided that, if the AG fails to meet its burden, CalVCB is required to approve the claim for wrongful conviction compensation. (Pen. Code, §§ 4904 & 4902, subd. (d).)
         
       • This bill states that the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the person is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the person through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the person is not entitled to compensation. The district attorney may not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the person is not entitled to compensation. In comparison, SB 446 provided that, the AG not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that the person is guilty of the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the person through court litigation, or that there was a conviction to establish that the person is not entitled to compensation. The AG may not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. (Pen. Code, § 4903 (d).)
2. Veto of SB 981 (Glazer): SB 981 (Glazer), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, was substantially similar to this bill. SB 981 received bipartisan support in the Legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. The Governor’s veto message explained:
   

The 2022 Budget included an improvement in the payment process for the erroneously convicted, allowing them to receive their compensation more quickly. This bill would unintentionally reverse part of that new payment process. If this bill is signed, some claimants will have their compensation delayed by several months, or in some cases, up to a year. I look forward to the author submitting a new bill next year on this issue.

For these reasons, I cannot sign this bill.

Specifically, AB 160 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 771, Statues of 2022, changed the process for payment of wrongful conviction compensation. Before AB 160, CalVCB was statutorily required to report the facts of the case and its conclusions to the Legislature with a recommendation that the Legislature make an appropriation for payment of the claim. For the claim to be paid, an act making an appropriation for the claim had to be introduced by the Legislature, passed by each house, and approved by the Governor.

AB 160 eliminated the requirement for CalVCB to make recommendation for the claim to be paid by the Legislature. Instead, AB 160 authorized CalVCB to directly approve payment to the person, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. In so doing, AB 160 streamlined the process for exonerees to receive wrongful conviction compensation. AB 160 was signed by the Governor and SB 981 was vetoed by the Governor that same day.

SB 981 would have retained language requiring CalVCB to make a recommendation to the Legislature for payment of the wrongful compensation claims. Accordingly, as the Governor indicated in his veto message, SB 981 would have undone some of the changes made by AB 160.

This bill addresses the Governor’s concerns and is consistent with the changes made by AB 160. For individuals who secure a court order that they are entitled to wrongful conviction compensation, CalVCB will be required to approve payment, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. This bill also makes necessary conforming changes to related code sections that were not addressed in AB 160, including Penal Code section 851.865, relating to declarations of factual innocence, and Penal Code section 1485.55 subdivisions (a), (c), and (e) relating to findings of factual innocence made by the court in motions to vacate and writs of habeas corpus.

1. Writs of Habeas Corpus and Motions to Vacate: The writ of habeas corpus is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from unlawful imprisonment or restraint. After having been released from imprisonment or other restraint, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to challenge a conviction. However, other means are available to challenge the conviction. This includes a motion to vacate. (Pen. Code, §§ 1473.6, 1473.7.)
   

If the district attorney or the AG stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate, the facts underlying the basis for the court’s ruling or order are binding on the AG, the factfinder, and CalVCB. (Pen. Code, § 1485.5 subd. (a).) Likewise, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, during proceedings on a petition for habeas corpus or motion to vacate, are binding on the AG, the factfinder, and CalVCB. (Pen. Code, § 1485.5 subd. (c).) The district attorney is required to provide notice to the AG prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate. (Pen. Code, § 1485.5 subd. (b).) If the court grants the writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate and found that the person is factually innocent, CalVCB is required to, within 30 days, and without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.55, subd. (a), 4902, subd. (a).)

This bill would provide that the district attorney shall provide notice to the AG no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for granting the writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate and provides that a response from the AG is not required to proceed with the stipulation. This bill would make technical and conforming changes that remove the requirement that a recommendation be made to the Legislature, and instead provide that CalVCB shall approve payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

1. Declarations and Findings of Factual Innocence: A person can petition for a declaration of factual innocence from the court if the person is arrested but no conviction occurred. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.8, 851.86, 851.865.) In any court hearing to determine the factual innocence of a party, the initial burden of proof shall rest with the petitioner to show that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was made. If the court finds that this showing of no reasonable cause has been made by the petitioner, then the burden of proof shall shift to the respondent to show that a reasonable cause exists to believe that the petitioner committed the offense for which the arrest was made. (Pen. Code, § 851.8, subd. (b).) If a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence from the court, the finding is sufficient grounds for payment of the wrongful conviction compensation claim. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.865.) CalVCB is required to, within 30 days, and without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.865 & 4902, subd. (a).)

A person can also seek a finding of factual innocence from the court if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subds. (b), (c) & (e).) If a court makes a finding that the person has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, CalVCB is required to, within 30 days, and without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.55, subds. (c) & (e) & 4902, subd. (a).)

This bill makes technical and conforming changes that remove the requirement that a recommendation be made to the Legislature for both findings of factual innocence (Pen. Code, §§ 1485.55, subds. (c) & (e)) and declarations of factual innocence (Pen. Code, § 851.865), and instead provide that CalVCB shall approve payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature. This bill would also increase the deadline for CalVCB to approve payment of the claim from 30 days to 90 days within the filing of the claim.

1. Argument in Support: According to the National Association of Social Workers – California Chapter (NASW-CA), “[t]his bill allows people who were wrongfully convicted to receive compensation from the court in the same way factually innocent people are able to receive compensation through the Victim’s Compensation Board.

“This bill is a follow up measure to SB 446 which shifted the proof of innocence from the wrongfully convicted to the Attorney General in claims before the Victim’s Compensation Board. SB 78 corrects an inequity in law when a wrongfully convicted person wants to pursue their claim in court. Parallel to the process set up in SB 446, this bill puts the burden of proof on the District Attorney. […]

“The bill also includes other provisions related to this issue and amends existing laws.”

1. Related Legislation:
   
   1. AB 997 (Gipson) would require CalVCB to reimburse an exonerated person for mental health services related to their incarceration. AB 997 is pending in Senate Public Safety Committee.
      
   2. SB 530 (Bradford) would, among other things, extend the deadline from 30 days to 90 days from the filing of a claim for CalVCB to calculate the compensation and approve payment. SB 530 was held under submission in Senate Appropriations Committee.
      
2. Prior Legislation:
   
   1. AB 160 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 771, Statutes of 2022, among other things, made numerous changes to the wrongful conviction compensation claims process within CalVCB.
      
   2. SB 993 (Skinner), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, would have, among other things, made numerous changes to the wrongful conviction compensation claims process within CalVCB. SB 993 died on the Assembly inactive file.
      
   3. SB 446 (Glazer), Chapter 449, Statutes of 2021, shifted the burden onto the state to prove, for the purposes of a wrongful compensation claim with CalVCB, that the claimant is not entitled to compensation.
      
   4. SB 981 (Glazer), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, was substantially similar to this bill. SB 981 was vetoed.
      
   5. SB 1137 (Monning), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, would have made a finding of factual innocence at an uncontested hearing binding on CalVCB for purposes of a wrongful conviction compensation claim, and would have required CalVCB to order compensation if a claimant established by a preponderance of the evidence that no reasonable jury would find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented to CalVCB. SB 1137 was not heard in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
      
   6. SB 269 (Bradford), Chapter 473, Statutes of 2019, extended the statute of limitations for when a wrongfully convicted individual can file a claim with CalVCB from two years to ten years after exoneration or release.
      
   7. SB 321 (Monning), of the 2017–2018 Legislative Session, would have required the Governor to appoint a special master to oversee all claims for compensation presented to CalVCB in wrongful conviction cases. SB 321 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
      
   8. SB 618 (Leno), Chapter 800, Statutes of 2013, streamlined and provided clarity to the process for compensating exonerated persons.
      
   9. AB 316 (Solorio), Chapter 432, Statutes of 2009, among other things, extended the timeline for filing claims with CalVCB from six months to two years and allowed a finding of factual innocence to be used as proof in a claim before CalVCB.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

ACLU California Action

California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project, California Innocence Project, Loyola Project for The Innocent

California Public Defenders Association

California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)

Californians United for A Responsible Budget

Ella Baker Center for Human Rights

Initiate Justice

Legal Services for Prisoners With Children

National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter

Prosecutors Alliance California

San Francisco Public Defender

Smart Justice California

University of San Francisco School of Law | Racial Justice Clinic

Opposition

None submitted.

Analysis Prepared by: Liah Burnley / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744

 CONSENT  

Bill No: SB 78

Author: Glazer (D), et al.

Introduced: 1/12/23

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-0, 3/28/23

AYES: Wahab, Ochoa Bogh, Bradford, Skinner, Wiener

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8

SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: factual innocence

SOURCE: California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project

California Innocence Project

Loyola Project for the Innocent

DIGEST:

This bill conforms the compensation process for wrongfully convicted in court to the process that occurs in the California Victims Compensation Board.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Establishes procedures for the filing and hearing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which allows a person to challenge their incarceration or related restraint as unlawful. (Penal Code §§ 1474-1508.)
2. States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
3. False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration;
4. False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; or,
5. New evidence, as defined, exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. (Penal Code § 1473 (b).)
6. Existing law authorizes a person no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment for any of the following reasons:
7. Newly discovered evidence of fraud by a government official that completely undermines the prosecution’s case, is conclusive, and points unerringly to his or her innocence;
8. Newly discovered evidence that a government official testified falsely at the trial that resulted in the conviction and that the testimony of the government official was substantially probative on the issue of guilt or punishment; or,
9. Newly discovered evidence of misconduct by a government official committed in the underlying case that resulted in fabrication of evidence that was substantially material and probative on the issue of guilt or punishment. Evidence of misconduct in other cases is not sufficient to warrant relief under this paragraph. (Penal Code § 1473.6(a).)
10. Authorizes a person who is no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence when newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice. (Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(2).)
11. States that whenever a person is convicted of a charge, and the conviction is set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge, the judge shall order that the records in the case be sealed, including any record of arrest or detention, upon written or oral motion of any party in the case or the court, and with notice to all parties to the case. (Penal Code § 851.86.)
12. Requires the court to inform a person whose conviction has been set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge of the availability of indemnity for persons erroneously convicted and the time limitations for presenting those claims to the California Victim Compensation Board (“board”). (Penal Code § 4900.)
13. Provides that after a writ of habeas was granted and the charges are subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges, the board, shall up0on application by the person, without a hearing, recommend to the legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid, unless the Attorney General establishes that the person is not entitled to compensation. (Penal Code § 4900 (b))
14. States that if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence, the finding shall be sufficient grounds for compensation by the board. Upon application, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made. (Penal Code § 851.865.)
15. Provides that if the district attorney or the Attorney General (AG) stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgement, the facts underlying the basis for the court’s ruling shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a).
16. States that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c).)
17. Provides that the district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the judgement. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (b).)
18. States that, in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgement, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that the finding shall be binding on the board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (a).)
19. Provides that, in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, as specified, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (b).)
20. States that if the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55, (c).)
21. Provides that if a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than preponderance of the evidence, the board shall without a hearing recommend the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55)
22. Provides that the Attorney General has 60 days to respond to any claim for which the board has recommended to the Legislature that a claim be paid and for which the person was not declared factually innocent. (Penal Code § 4902(a))
23. Provides that in cases where a person was acquitted or the charges were dismissed after a habeas petition was granted, the Attorney General may object to a claim in writing within 45 days and may request a single 45 day extension. (Penal Code § 4902(d))

This bill:

1. Provides that the notice from the district attorney to the Attorney General shall be no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
2. Provides that a response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.
3. Provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature the payment be made, the board shall approve the payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
4. Provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature, the board shall approve payment of the claim if funds are available, upon appropriation of the Legislature.
5. Provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if a state has granted a writ of habeas corpus, or vacated a judgement, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, the petition may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation.
6. Provides that the court shall issue a finding in favor of compensation unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the motion and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore entitled to compensation.
7. Provides that the district attorney shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that het person committed the acts constituting the offense. The district attorney may request a single 30 day extension of time upon a showing of good cause and a further extension of time may be given if agreed upon by both parties.
8. Provides that if the district attorney does not object, or if the district attorney fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense, the court shall grant the motion and the board shall, upon application by the person, without a hearing, approve of payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
9. Provides that if the motion is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the district attorney, the duty of the board to without a hearing, approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature shall apply.
10. Provides that if a conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that he claimant is guilty of a crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through litigation, or that there was conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
11. Provides that the district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.
12. Provides that if a federal court after granting a writ of habeas corpus finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence the board without a hearing shall approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.
13. Provides that an extension beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney General’s office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for review.

Background

According to the author:

The signing of SB 446 into law created a more just and equitable compensation process by transferring the responsibility of proof from the wrongfully convicted individual to the Attorney General in compensation proceedings in front of the Victim’s Compensation Board (VCB).

Individuals who have claimed compensation are granted the presumption of innocence by law if their conviction has been overturned. Current law requires the Attorney General to object to only those claims in which they believe the person should not be compensated. If the Attorney General chooses to object to the individual’s claim, there must be sufficient, clear, and concise evidence proving the decision to not grant compensation.

However, while SB 446 constructed a fair shift to the Attorney General’s office in compensation proceedings in front of the VCB, the law did not allocate the burden to the District Attorney’s office if a wrongfully convicted person instead chose to pursue the existing process through the court.

This oversight has unintentionally tipped the scales to create a more fair and efficient process in the VCB than the courts. The potential for incentivizing wrongfully convicted individuals to go through the VCB rather than the courts, likely places an unbalanced burden on the Attorney General’s office to handle these cases rather than them being equitably distributed through the processes.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No

SUPPORT: (Verified 5/2/23)

California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project (co-source)

California Innocence Project (co-source)

Loyola Project for the Innocent (co-source)
ACLU California Action

California Public Defenders Association
Californians United for A Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Prosecutors Alliance California
San Francisco Public Defender
Smart Justice California
University of San Francisco School of Law | Racial Justice Clinic

OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/2/23)

None received

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the sponsors:

To receive compensation for years lost to wrongful incarceration, exonerated persons choose whether to pursue compensation proceedings in (1) a Superior Court where they litigate against the District Attorney or (B) at the Victim’s Compensation Board where they litigate against the Attorney General. Thus, after a court has already found that an individual was wrongfully convicted by the State, their conviction has been reversed and the State has dismissed the charges or the person was acquitted after a retrial and that individual is now cloaked with the presumption of innocence, the individual must then, through additional litigation, show that they are innocent in order to obtain compensation. The claims process involves lengthy litigation and inconsistent results, leaving many wrongfully convicted citizens without compensation.

Last year, the Legislature came together to reform one of California’s two compensation forums, making the process more efficient, consistent, and just for the wrongfully convicted. Representing an important first step in ameliorating this burdensome system, SB 446 enacted important changes to the VCB’s compensation proceedings: the legislation shifted the burden of proof from the wrongly convicted person to the Attorney General. When arguing in front of the VCB, the Attorney General now must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. Unfortunately, however, SB 446 neglected to make the same changes to the compensation process in Superior Courts.

SB 78 extends the spirit of SB 446; it would make the same change to compensation proceedings in the Superior Courts by shifting the burden to the District Attorney to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. SB 981 merely ensures that both paths for pursuing compensation are consistent so as to not unduly burden one representative of the State and to make the process fair and just for the wrongfully convicted in both arenas.

SB 78 will bring consistency to California’s two compensation systems. Consistency in this case is important both for exonerated individuals as well as for the systems they navigate – if SB 78 is not passed, most wrongly convicted individuals will file for compensation through the VCB process, straining VCB and the Attorney General’s resources in ways that will likely create additional delays and costs.

The wrongfully convicted have lost years of their lives due to their incarceration and years in litigation proving their innocence in the Courts. These individuals deserve to be compensated by a system that is not only just but also efficient – for as the timeworn maxim goes: Justice delayed is justice denied. SB 78 is being run again in 2023 as some language in SB 981 for 2022 was chaptered out by the 2022 budget bill.

Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /

5/3/23 15:16:06

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Senator Aisha Wahab, Chair

2023 - 2024 Regular

Bill No: SB 78 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023

Subject: Criminal procedure: factual innocence

HISTORY

Source: The California Innocence Project/ Northern California Innocence Project 

Prior Legislation: SB 981 (Glazer) Vetoed 2022

SB 446 (Glazer) Chapter 490; Stats. 2021

SB 1137 (Monning), never head in committee, 2020

SB 269 (Bradford), Ch. 473, Stats. 2019

SB 1134 (Leno), Ch. 785, Stats. 2016

SB 1058 (Leno) Ch. 623, Stats. 2014

SB 618 (Leno), Ch. 800, Stats. 2013

AB 319 (Solorio), Ch. 432, Stats. 2009

Support: California Innocence Coalition: Northern California Innocence Project, California Innocence Project, Loyola Project for The Innocent; California Public Defenders Association; Californians United for A Responsible Budget; Initiate Justice; Legal Services for Prisoners With Children; Smart Justice California; University of San Francisco School of Law | Racial Justice Clinic

Opposition: None known

PURPOSE

The purpose of this bill is to conform the compensation process for wrongfully convicted in court to the process that occurs in the California Victims Compensation Board.

Existing law establishes procedures for the filing and hearing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which allows a person to challenge their incarceration or related restraint as unlawful. (Penal Code §§ 1474-1508.)

Existing law states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:

• False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration;
• False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; or,
• New evidence, as defined, exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. (Penal Code § 1473 (b).)

Existing law authorizes a person no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment for any of the following reasons:

• Newly discovered evidence of fraud by a government official that completely undermines the prosecution’s case, is conclusive, and points unerringly to his or her innocence;
• Newly discovered evidence that a government official testified falsely at the trial that resulted in the conviction and that the testimony of the government official was substantially probative on the issue of guilt or punishment; or,
• Newly discovered evidence of misconduct by a government official committed in the underlying case that resulted in fabrication of evidence that was substantially material and probative on the issue of guilt or punishment. Evidence of misconduct in other cases is not sufficient to warrant relief under this paragraph. (Penal Code § 1473.6(a).)

Existing law authorizes a person who is no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence when newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice. (Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(2).)

Existing law states that whenever a person is convicted of a charge, and the conviction is set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge, the judge shall order that the records in the case be sealed, including any record of arrest or detention, upon written or oral motion of any party in the case or the court, and with notice to all parties to the case. (Penal Code § 851.86.)

Existing law requires the court to inform a person whose conviction has been set aside based upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge of the availability of indemnity for persons erroneously convicted and the time limitations for presenting those claims to the California Victim Compensation Board (“board”). (Penal Code § 4900.)

Existing law provides that after a writ of habeas was granted and the charges are subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges, the board, shall up0on application by the person, without a hearing, recommend to the legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid, unless the Attorney General establishes that the person is not entitled to compensation. (Penal Code § 4900 (b))

Existing law states that if a person has secured a declaration of factual innocence, the finding shall be sufficient grounds for compensation by the board. Upon application, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made. (Penal Code § 851.865.)

Existing law provides that if the district attorney or the Attorney General (AG) stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgement, the facts underlying the basis for the court’s ruling shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a).

Existing law states that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c).)

Existing law provides that the district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the judgement. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (b).)

This bill provides that the notice from the district attorney to the Attorney General shall be no fewer than seven days before entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.

This bill provides that a response from the Attorney General is not required to proceed with the stipulation.

Existing law states that, in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when the court vacates a judgement, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that the finding shall be binding on the board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (a).)

This bill provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature the payment be made, the board shall approve the payment if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

Existing law provides that, in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or vacated a judgment, as specified, the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner. (Penal Code § 1485.55 (b).)

Existing law states that if the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55, (c).)

This bill provides that instead of recommending to the Legislature, the board shall approve payment of the claim if funds are available, upon appropriation of the Legislature.

This bill provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if a state has granted a writ of habeas corpus, or vacated a judgement, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, or the person was acquitted of the charges on a retrial, the petition may move the court for a finding that they are entitled to compensation.

This bill provides that the court shall issue a finding in favor of compensation unless the district attorney objects in writing within 15 days from when the person files the motion and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore entitled to compensation.

This bill provides that the district attorney shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that het person committed the acts constituting the offense. The district attorney may request a single 30 day extension of time upon a showing of good cause and a further extension of time may be given if agreed upon by both parties.

This bill provides that if the district attorney does not object, or if the district attorney fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense, the court shall grant the motion and the board shall, upon application by the person, without a hearing, approve of payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

This bill provides that if the motion is granted pursuant to a stipulation of the district attorney, the duty of the board to without a hearing, approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature shall apply.

This bill provides that if a conviction reversed and dismissed is no longer valid, thus the district attorney may not rely on the fact that the state still maintains that he claimant is guilty of a crime for which they were wrongfully convicted, that the state defended the conviction against the petitioner through litigation, or that there was conviction to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.

This bill provides that the district attorney may also not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation.

Existing law provides that if a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than preponderance of the evidence, the board shall without a hearing recommend the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim paid. (Penal Code § 1485.55)

This bill provides that if a federal court after granting a writ of habeas corpus finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence the board without a hearing shall approve payment to the claimant, if sufficient funds are available, upon appropriation by the Legislature.

Existing law provides that the Attorney General has 60 days to respond to any claim for which the board has recommended to the Legislature that a claim be paid and for which the person was not declared factually innocent. (Penal Code § 4902(a))

Existing law provides that in cases where a person was acquitted or the charges were dismissed after a habeas petition was granted, the Attorney General may object to a claim in writing within 45 days and may request a single 45 day extension. (Penal Code § 4902(d))

This bill provides that an extension beyond this period may be given if agreed upon by stipulation between both parties. Time needed to obtain and review juvenile records may establish good cause for additional 45-day extensions upon a showing that through the exercise of due diligence the Attorney General’s office is unable to obtain sufficient documents for review.

COMMENTS

1. Need for This Bill

According to the author:

The signing of SB 446 into law created a more just and equitable compensation process by transferring the responsibility of proof from the wrongfully convicted individual to the Attorney General in compensation proceedings in front of the Victim’s Compensation Board (VCB).

Individuals who have claimed compensation are granted the presumption of innocence by law if their conviction has been overturned. Current law requires the Attorney General to object to only those claims in which they believe the person should not be compensated. If the Attorney General chooses to object to the individual’s claim, there must be sufficient, clear, and concise evidence proving the decision to not grant compensation.

However, while SB 446 constructed a fair shift to the Attorney General’s office in compensation proceedings in front of the VCB, the law did not allocate the burden to the District Attorney’s office if a wrongfully convicted person instead chose to pursue the existing process through the court.

This oversight has unintentionally tipped the scales to create a more fair and efficient process in the VCB than the courts. The potential for incentivizing wrongfully convicted individuals to go through the VCB rather than the courts, likely places an unbalanced burden on the Attorney General’s office to handle these cases rather than them being equitably distributed through the processes

2. Writ of Habeas Corpus

Writ of habeas corpus, also known as "the Great Writ", is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1473: "Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint."

A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons: (1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration; (2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; or (3) New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. (Pen. Code, §1473, subd. (b).)

Other avenues of challenging a conviction include a motion to vacate the judgement after being released. Such motions may be pursued in a couple of situations, including when new evidence is discovered that tends to prove the defendant is innocent, and when it is discovered that false evidence was used in trial and it was material and substantial in proving the defendant’s guilt. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1473.6 and 1473.7, subd. (a)(2).)

3. Compensation for the Wrongfully Convicted

Existing law allows a person who has been wrongfully convicted of a felony and imprisoned to file a claim for compensation at a rate of $140 per day of imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 4904.) If a claimant has first obtained a declaration of factual innocence from a court, this finding is binding on the board and the AG, who represents the state in wrongful conviction claims, and the board is required to recommend to the Legislature to make a payment to the claimant within 30 days of the claim.

For claimants who have not obtained a declaration of factual innocence, the AG must respond to the claim within 60 days or request an extension of time, upon a showing of good cause. (Pen. Code, § 4903, subd. (a).) Upon receipt of the response from the AG, the board must set a time and place for the hearing and mail notice of the hearing to the claimant and the AG. The board is required to use reasonable diligence in setting the date for the hearing and shall attempt to set the date for the hearing at the earliest date convenient for all parties and the board. (Pen. Code, § 4902.) In order to be successful on a claim of wrongful conviction, the claimant must show at the hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or if committed, was not committed by him or her, and (2) the pecuniary injury sustained by him or her through his or her erroneous conviction and imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 4903.) The AG may introduce evidence in opposition of the claim. (Ibid.) At the hearing, the board considers all of the evidence presented and makes a determination as to whether the claimant has met the requisite burden of proof.

4. Presumption of factual innocence in court.

Existing law provides that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates the judgement, a person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which they were charge was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the petitioner.

As SB 446 did with cases before the board, this bill changes the presumption so that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates the judgement a person may move for a finding of factual innocence and if the court or district attorney has dismissed the charges, or if the person has been acquitted on retrial it shall be presumed. The presumption may only be overturned if the district attorney objects and can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person committed the acts constituting the offense and is therefore not entitled to compensation. The district attorney’s objection must occur within 15 days with the possibility of one 30 day extension. The time may also be extended if both parties agree by stipulation.

5. Notice to the Attorney General

Existing law requires a district attorney to notify the Attorney General when they enter into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment. This bill provides that that stipulation should be no fewer than seven days prior to the stipulation of facts.

6. Veto to SB 981 (Glazer) 2022

In his veto message to SB 981 the Governor stated:

I am returning Senate Bill 981 without my signature.

This bill would provide that, for defendants whose convictions were reversed on habeas and the district attorney fails to object and provide clear and convincing evidence of guilt, the court issues an order that they are entitled to compensation through the California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB).

The 2022 Budget included an improvement in the payment process for the erroneously convicted, allowing them to receive their compensation more quickly. This bill would unintentionally reverse part of that new payment process. If this bill is signed, some claimants will have their compensation delayed by several months, or in some cases, up to a year. I look forward to the author submitting a new bill next year on this issue.

For these reasons, I cannot sign this bill

This bill addresses the Chaptering problems that happened with SB 981.

7. Argument in Support

According to the Innocence Coalition:

To receive compensation for years lost to wrongful incarceration, exonerated persons choose whether to pursue compensation proceedings in (1) a Superior Court where they litigate against the District Attorney or (B) at the Victim’s Compensation Board where they litigate against the Attorney General. Thus, after a court has already found that an individual was wrongfully convicted by the State, their conviction has been reversed and the State has dismissed the charges or the person was acquitted after a retrial and that individual is now cloaked with the presumption of innocence, the individual must then, through additional litigation, show that they are innocent in order to obtain compensation. The claims process involves lengthy litigation and inconsistent results, leaving many wrongfully convicted citizens without compensation.

Last year, the Legislature came together to reform one of California’s two compensation forums, making the process more efficient, consistent, and just for the wrongfully convicted. Representing an important first step in ameliorating this burdensome system, SB 446 enacted important changes to the VCB’s compensation proceedings: the legislation shifted the burden of proof from the wrongly convicted person to the Attorney General. When arguing in front of the VCB, the Attorney General now must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. Unfortunately, however, SB 446 neglected to make the same changes to the compensation process in Superior Courts.

SB 78 extends the spirit of SB 446; it would make the same change to compensation proceedings in the Superior Courts by shifting the burden to the District Attorney to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an exonerated person does not deserve compensation. SB 981 merely ensures that both paths for pursuing compensation are consistent so as to not unduly burden one representative of the State and to make the process fair and just for the wrongfully convicted in both arenas.

SB 78 will bring consistency to California’s two compensation systems. Consistency in this case is important both for exonerated individuals as well as for the systems they navigate – if SB 78 is not passed, most wrongly convicted individuals will file for compensation through the VCB process, straining VCB and the Attorney General’s resources in ways that will likely create additional delays and costs.

The wrongfully convicted have lost years of their lives due to their incarceration and years in litigation proving their innocence in the Courts. These individuals deserve to be compensated by a system that is not only just but also efficient – for as the timeworn maxim goes: Justice delayed is justice denied. SB 78 is being run again in 2023 as some language in SB 981 for 2022 was chaptered out by the 2022 budget bill.

-- END –