Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.

This bill would, consistent with the intent of Proposition 57, authorize the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction when the minor is alleged to have committed certain specified offenses when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age and was previously convicted in a court of criminal jurisdiction and is now subject to resentencing in juvenile court pursuant to specified provisions.

Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.

This bill would, consistent with the intent of Proposition 57, authorize the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction when the minor is alleged to have committed certain specified offenses when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age and was previously convicted in a court of criminal jurisdiction and is now subject to resentencing in juvenile court pursuant to specified provisions.

Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.

This bill would, consistent with the intent of Proposition 57, authorize the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction when the minor is alleged to have committed certain specified offenses when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age. age and was previously convicted in a court of criminal jurisdiction and is now subject to resentencing in juvenile court pursuant to specified provisions.

Existing law allows a person sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole who was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense to petition the court for recall of their sentence and resentencing, as specified. Existing law prohibits a person from seeking recall and resentencing pursuant to these provisions if it is pleaded and proved that the person committed certain offenses and the victim was a public safety official, including any law enforcement personnel.

This bill would additionally prohibit a person from seeking recall and resentencing pursuant to these provisions where it was pled and proved that the defendant, within the same proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or 2nd degree, that the offense constitutes a mass shooting, as defined, or that the offense was committed in a school zone or on the property of a place of worship.

Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.

This bill would, consistent with the intent of Proposition 57, authorize the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction when the minor is alleged to have committed certain specified offenses when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age.

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: AB 1959

Author: Patel (D)

Amended: 4/9/26 in Assembly

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-0, 6/30/26

AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Pérez, Wiener

NO VOTE RECORDED: Cortese

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/13/26

AYES: Cervantes, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Dahle, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 69-0, 5/21/26 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Juvenile justice

SOURCE: San Diego County District Attorney’s Office

DIGEST:

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welfare and Institutions (Welf. & Inst.) Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
2. Establishes criteria to determine whether to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
3. Provides that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
4. Provides that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. Specifies that this motion must be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)
5. Requires the court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Requires the court to consider the following criteria, inclusive, in making its decision:
6. The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication;
7. Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature;
8. The minor’s previous delinquent history. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior;
9. Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs; and,
10. The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. Requires the court to consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
11. Provides that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances has been found true, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be a sentence of LWOP or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 190.5.)
12. Allows an incarcerated person serving a sentence of LWOP for an offense that was committed when the person was under 18 years of age to petition the court to have that sentence recalled and to be resentenced if the person has served at least 15 years of their sentence and meets certain other specified criteria. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1).)
13. Excludes from the recall and resentencing process for persons sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed when the person was under 18 years of age where it was pled and proved that the defendant tortured their victim, or the victim was a public safety official, including a law enforcement personnel or a firefighter. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(B).)
14. Requires the court, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statements provided by the defendant, as specified, is true, to recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence. Requires that victims or victims’ family members retain rights to participate in the hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
15. Provides that the factors the court may consider when determining whether to resentence the defendant to a life term include, but are not limited to, the following:
16. The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law;
17. The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP;
18. The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant;
19. Prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP, the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered from psychological or physical trauma or significant stress;
20. The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness, developmental disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense but influenced the defendant’s involvement in the offense;
21. The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse;
22. The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others through letter writing, calls, or visits or has eliminated contact with individuals outside of prison who are currently involved with crime;
23. The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the last five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor; and,
24. Any other criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies them on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and states why the defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(6), (11).)
25. Provides that the court has the discretion to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(7).)
26. Provides that the court may resentence the defendant to a term that is less than the initial sentence if any of the following were a contributing factor in the commission of the alleged offense (but specifies that the court may resentence the defendant to a term that is less than the initial sentence even if none of the circumstances are present):
27. The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.
28. The person is a youth or was a youth, as defined, at the time of the commission of the offense.
29. Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(8)-(9).)
30. Provides that a defendant whose sentence is not recalled or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, may submit another petition when the defendant has served at least 20 years. Permits the defendant to file another petition after having served 24 years if that petition is denied or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP under the new petition. Authorizes the final petition to be submitted during the 25th year of the defendant’s sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(10).)
31. Establishes the Youthful Offender Parole Program which provides an incarcerated person the opportunity for a parole hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for crimes committed before the age of 25, after having served 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration depending on their controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
32. Provides that a youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by BPH for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any incarcerated person who was 25 years of age or younger, or was under 18 years of age and sentenced to LWOP, at the time of the controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1).)
33. Specifies the following timeline for youth offender parole hearings to occur:
34. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a determinate sentence shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration;
35. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of less than 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 20th year of incarceration;
36. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration; and,
37. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).)
38. Requires, in assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if used by BPH, to be administered by licensed psychologists employed by the board and to take into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1).)

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of LWOP or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

Background

Recall and Resentencing via Penal Code section 1170. In accordance with U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court decisions, SB 9 (Yee, Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012), was signed into law to provide juveniles sentenced to LWOP a mechanism for recall and resentencing. Pursuant to SB 9, a person who was under 18 years of age at the time of committing an offense for which the person was sentenced to LWOP could, after serving at least 15 years in prison, petition the court for recall and resentencing. If a resentencing hearing is granted, the court has the discretion whether to resentence the petitioner to a lower sentence or let the LWOP sentence remain. If granted a lower sentence, the petitioner must still serve the minimum sentence before being eligible for parole consideration and obtain approval of the parole board and the Governor prior to release on parole. SB 1084 (Hancock, Chapter 867, Statutes of 2016), modified the resentencing law to clarify when a youthful offender could petition for recall and resentencing, the standard by which the court is to review the petition, and that a petitioner who does not have their sentence recalled or is resentenced to LWOP can submit another petition after a specified number of years.

Youth Offender Parole. After creating the judicial mechanism to resentence youthful offenders from LWOP to a life sentence with the possibility of parole, the Legislature established Youth Offender Parole in 2014, which provides a parole process for some individuals serving both indeterminate sentences and determinate sentences. As originally enacted, Youth Offender Parole only applied to individuals who were under 18 at the time of their commitment offense. Eligibility was expanded in subsequent years and now applies to individuals who were 25 years of age or younger at the time of the offense. Additionally, Penal Code section 3051 was amended to apply to individuals sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 years of age.

The LWOP recall and resentencing law and the Youth Offender Parole process are two separate processes with some overlap. The recall and resentencing statute—Penal Code section 1170(d)—provides incarcerated persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 an opportunity for recall and resentencing after serving 15 years. The Youth Offender Parole process, codified in Penal Code section 3051, provides persons sentenced to a life sentence for crimes committed prior to turning 26 and persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18, with an opportunity for parole. Excluded from both statutes are individuals who committed their offense between the ages of 18 to 25 for which they were sentenced to LWOP.

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult court of a crime that they committed at the age of 14 or 15 and is now before the juvenile court for resentencing. The avenue for triggering resentencing by the juvenile court would be a grant of recall pursuant to the LWOP resentencing statute (i.e., Penal Code section 1170(d).). Under the provisions of this bill, the prosecutor would have to file the transfer motion, and the juvenile court would have to make a determination that the person is not amenable to treatment in juvenile court before the person may be transferred.

This bill was introduced in response to the recall and resentencing of Andy Williams, who was sentenced to 50 years-to-life in prison after he was convicted of two counts of murder and 13 counts of attempted murder for committing a mass shooting at his high school when he was 15 in 2001. Williams became eligible for parole in September 2024 but was found unsuitable for release by the parole board. In January of this year, a judge granted Williams’ petition for recall and resentencing relying on case law that found a sentence of 50-year-to-life for a juvenile offender was the functional equivalent of LWOP and excluding someone with his type of sentence from the recall and resentencing law violates equal protection. (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608.) The ruling in Heard was recently clarified to find that Heard’s reasoning does not apply to a request for resentencing if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed. (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 791.)

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

Potentially major incarceration costs on CDCR. To the extent the bill results in individuals being resentenced in adult court rather than juvenile court, it could result in longer periods of incarceration in state prison rather than disposition through the juvenile system. CDCR estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $138,000. (General Fund)

Likely significant court cost pressure for additional transfer hearings in juvenile court. The bill applies to a narrow population: individuals who were convicted in adult court for crimes committed at age 14 or 15 and whose sentences have been recalled and referred to juvenile court for resentencing. If the juvenile court grants transfer to adult court, the case would be resentenced in adult criminal court rather than adjudicated in juvenile court.

Transfer hearings are the costliest hearings held in juvenile courts. Though these hearings for 14-15 year olds rarely result in transfer, as opposed to 16-18 year olds, each hearing may last at least a week of court time, with concomitant costs to the District Attorney, appointed defense counsel, and the juvenile probation department. Additionally, there are court costs for expert witnesses that are routinely necessary, including experts in adolescent neuropsychology and state prison conditions, and for those required in individual cases, such as gang influence experts, country of origin conditions experts, and intellectual disability experts.

An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would increase pressure to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).

SUPPORT: (Verified 8/13/26)

San Diego County District Attorney’s Office (source)

California District Attorneys Association

California Police Chiefs Association

League of California Cities

Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office

OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/13/26)

ACLU California Action

Buen Vecino

Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice

Justice2Jobs Coalition

La Defensa

San Francisco Public Defender

San Quentin Skunkworks

South Bay People Power

Universidad Popular

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 69-0, 5/21/26

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Zbur, Rivas

NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Bonta, Caloza, Chen, Garcia, Lackey, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Sharp-Collins, Wilson

Prepared by: Stephanie Jordan / PUB. S. /

8/15/26 15:48:05

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON

Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular Session

AB 1959 (Patel) - Juvenile justice

Bill Summary:

AB 1959 would authorize a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult court for a crime committed at age 14 or 15, who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a persons who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

Fiscal Impact:

Potentially major incarceration costs on CDCR. To the extent the bill results in individuals being resentenced in adult court rather than juvenile court, it could result in longer periods of incarceration in state prison rather than disposition through the juvenile system. CDCR estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $138,000. (General Fund)

Likely significant court cost pressure for additional transfer hearings in juvenile court. The bill applies to a narrow population: individuals who were convicted in adult court for crimes committed at age 14 or 15 and whose sentences have been recalled and referred to juvenile court for resentencing. If the juvenile court grants transfer to adult court, the case would be resentenced in adult criminal court rather than adjudicated in juvenile court.

Transfer hearings are the costliest hearings held in juvenile courts. Though these hearings for 14-15 year olds rarely result in transfer, as opposed to 16-18 year olds, each hearing may last at least a week of court time, with concomitant costs to the District Attorney, appointed defense counsel, and the juvenile probation department. Additionally, there are court costs for expert witnesses that are routinely necessary, including experts in adolescent neuropsychology and state prison conditions, and for those required in individual cases, such as gang influence experts, country of origin conditions experts, and intellectual disability experts.

An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would increase pressure to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).

Background:

Existing law provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, when the minor violates the law, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. In a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.

In a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular

Bill No: AB 1959 Hearing Date: June 30, 2026

Subject: Juvenile justice

HISTORY

Source: San Diego County District Attorney’s Office

Prior Legislation: SB 481 (Durazo), ordered to the Senate Inactive File, 2021

AB 965 (Stone), Ch. 577, Stats. of 2019

AB 1308 (Stone), Ch. 675, Stats. of 2017

SB 394 (Lara), Ch. 684, Stats. of 2017

SB 1084 (Hancock), Ch. 867, Stats. of 2016

SB 261 (Hancock), Ch. 471, Stats. of 2015

SB 260 (Hancock), Ch. 312, Stats. of 2013

SB 9 (Yee), Ch. 828, Stats. of 2012

Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Police Chiefs Association; League of California Cities; Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office

Opposition: ACLU California Action; Buen Vecino; Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice; Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice; Justice2Jobs Coalition; La Defensa; San Francisco Public Defender; San Quentin Skunkworks; South Bay People Power

Assembly Floor Vote: 69 - 0

PURPOSE

The purpose of this bill is to authorize a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

Existing law provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)

Existing law establishes criteria to determine whether to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)

Existing law provides that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)

Existing law provides that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. Specifies that this motion must be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)

Existing law requires the court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Requires the court to consider the following criteria, inclusive, in making its decision:

• The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication;
• Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature;
• The minor’s previous delinquent history. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior;
• Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs; and,
• The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. Requires the court to consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)

Existing law provides that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances has been found true, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be a sentence of LWOP or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 190.5.)

Existing law allows an incarcerated person serving a sentence of LWOP for an offense that was committed when the person was under 18 years of age to petition the court to have that sentence recalled and to be resentenced if the person has served at least 15 years of their sentence and meets certain other specified criteria. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1).)

Existing law excludes from the recall and resentencing process for persons sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed when the person was under 18 years of age where it was pled and proved that the defendant tortured their victim, or the victim was a public safety official, including a law enforcement personnel or a firefighter. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(B).)

Existing law requires the court, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statements provided by the defendant, as specified, is true, to recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence. Requires that victims or victims’ family members retain rights to participate in the hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(5).)

Existing law provides that the factors the court may consider when determining whether to resentence the defendant to a life term include, but are not limited to, the following:

• The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law;
• The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP;
• The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant;
• Prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP, the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered from psychological or physical trauma or significant stress;
• The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness, developmental disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense but influenced the defendant’s involvement in the offense;
• The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse;
• The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others through letter writing, calls, or visits or has eliminated contact with individuals outside of prison who are currently involved with crime;
• The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the last five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor; and,
• Any other criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies them on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and states why the defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(6), (11).)

Existing law provides that the court has the discretion to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(7).)

Existing law provides that the court may resentence the defendant to a term that is less than the initial sentence if any of the following were a contributing factor in the commission of the alleged offense (but specifies that the court may resentence the defendant to a term that is less than the initial sentence even if none of the circumstances are present):

• The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.
• The person is a youth or was a youth, as defined, at the time of the commission of the offense.
• Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(8)-(9).)

Existing law provides that a defendant whose sentence is not recalled or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, may submit another petition when the defendant has served at least 20 years. Permits the defendant to file another petition after having served 24 years if that petition is denied or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP under the new petition. Authorizes the final petition to be submitted during the 25th year of the defendant’s sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(10).)

Existing law establishes the Youthful Offender Parole Program which provides an incarcerated person the opportunity for a parole hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for crimes committed before the age of 25, after having served 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration depending on their controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)

Existing law provides that a youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by BPH for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any incarcerated person who was 25 years of age or younger, or was under 18 years of age and sentenced to LWOP, at the time of the controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1).)

Existing law specifies the following timeline for youth offender parole hearings to occur:

• A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a determinate sentence shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration;
• A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of less than 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 20th year of incarceration;
• A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration; and,
• A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).)

Existing law requires, in assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if used by BPH, to be administered by licensed psychologists employed by the board and to take into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1).)

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of LWOP or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

COMMENTS

1. Need For This Bill

According to the author:

AB 1959 seeks to close a loophole within resentencing law that has recently been exploited in San Diego County by a school shooter at Santanna High School in 2001. San Diegans deserve to have faith in their justice system to ensure that violent offenders that do not show accountability are using this loophole.

1. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

As a general rule, any person between the age of 12 and 17 who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time of arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)

The purpose of the juvenile law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the court and to preserve and strengthen family ties when possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).)

1. Eighth Amendment Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) California’s constitution contains a similar prohibition: “Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)

For over two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished the constitutionally permissible punishment of juvenile offenders from adults. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense are ineligible for the death penalty, reasoning that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any offender under 18, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551.) Penal Code section 190.5 provides the penalty for a person 16 to 18 years of age convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances is either LWOP or, at the court’s discretion, 25-years-to-life. (Pen. Code, § 190.5, subd. (b).)

In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth who did not commit homicide to LWOP. (See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48.) The Court discussed the fundamental differences between a juvenile and adult offender and reasserted its findings from Roper that juveniles have lessened culpability than adults due to those differences. The Court stated that “life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” noting that a juvenile offender “will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 70.) However, the Court stressed that “while the Eighth Amendment forbids a State from imposing a sentence of life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.” (Id. at p. 75.)

In 2012, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, that it is unconstitutional for states to mandate a sentence of LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide. “Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other--the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile . . . will receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses--but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 476-477.) Following Miller, the Court held that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders must be applied retroactively in all cases. (Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 206.)

The California Supreme Court, relying on Miller, concluded that sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268.) The Court stated that “the state may not deprive [juveniles] at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the future.” (Ibid.) Caballero had received a 110-to-life sentence (three consecutive life terms) for attempted murder. While the court in Caballero pointed out that these incarcerated persons may file petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the trial court, the court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole eligibility mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto life term for crimes committed as a juvenile.

Roper, Miller, Graham, and Caballero establish that minors are constitutionally different from adults and emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit the most serious crimes.^[1] Notably, these decisions do not support crime-specific exclusions from their findings on the distinctive attributes of youth that mitigate criminal culpability.

1. Existing Laws on Resentencing and Parole of Juvenile Offenders

Recall and Resentencing via Penal Code section 1170

In accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court discussed above, SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012, was signed into law to provide juveniles sentenced to LWOP a mechanism for recall and resentencing. Pursuant to SB 9, a person who was under 18 years of age at the time of committing an offense for which the person was sentenced to LWOP could, after serving at least 15 years in prison, petition the court for recall and resentencing. If a resentencing hearing is granted, the court has the discretion whether to resentence the petitioner to a lower sentence or let the LWOP sentence remain. If granted a lower sentence, the petitioner must still serve the minimum sentence before being eligible for parole consideration and obtain approval of the parole board and the Governor prior to release on parole. A few years later, SB 1084 (Hancock), Chapter 867, Statutes of 2016, modified the resentencing law to clarify when a youthful offender could petition for recall and resentencing, the standard by which the court is to review the petition, and that a petitioner who does not have their sentence recalled or is resentenced to LWOP can submit another petition after a specified number of years.

Youth Offender Parole

After creating the judicial mechanism to resentence youthful offenders from LWOP to a life sentence with the possibility of parole, the Legislature established Youth Offender Parole in 2014, which provides a parole process for some individuals serving both indeterminate sentences and determinate sentences. As originally enacted, Youth Offender Parole only applied to individuals who were under 18 at the time of their commitment offense. Eligibility was expanded in subsequent years and now applies to individuals who were 25 years of age or younger at the time of the offense. Additionally, Penal Code section 3051 was amended to apply to individuals sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 years of age.^[2]

The LWOP recall and resentencing law and the Youth Offender Parole process are two separate processes with some overlap. The recall and resentencing statute—Penal Code section 1170(d)—provides incarcerated persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 an opportunity for recall and resentencing after serving 15 years. The Youth Offender Parole process, codified in Penal Code section 3051, provides persons sentenced to a life sentence for crimes committed prior to turning 26 and persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18, with an opportunity for parole. Excluded from both statutes are individuals who committed their offense between the ages of 18 to 25 for which they were sentenced to LWOP.

1. Juvenile Transfers

The Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Act, enacted in 1961, established 16 as the minimum age for which a minor could be transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Over 30 years later, AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age at which a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court from 16 to 14 years of age. According to the author statement included in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s analysis of AB 560:

The public is legitimately concerned that crimes of violence committed by juveniles are increasing in number and in terms of the level of violence….There is a finite number of juveniles who are under 16 who do not belong in the juvenile court system and need to be dealt with in the adult court….AB 560 takes a 707(a) approach to certain 707(b) crimes. This approach is one that juvenile court judges in San Diego County support as they feel that there are a finite number of 14 to 16 year olds who do not belong in the juvenile court and are infecting other juveniles….AB 560 is a rational response to the legitimate public desire to address what is a serious problem….AB 560 attempts to protect the public and those youngsters who we can save…. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 560 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 21, 1994, p. 4.)

In response to the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise and more dangerous than the delinquency of earlier decades, Proposition 21 was passed by the voters in 2000, which increased sentences for specified gang-related crimes, authorized a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court for specified felonies, prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offenses, and designated additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, among other things. (Ballot Pamp., Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000), text of Prop. 21, p. 45 et seq.)

As discussed above, there have been a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving juvenile defendants that have recognized the inherent difference between juveniles and adults for purposes of sentencing, relying in part on research on brain and adolescent development. (See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460.) The Court summarized those differences in Miller:

Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (567 U.S. 460, 570 [125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].)

This body of case law and the research relied upon in these cases prompted the passage of several juvenile justice reform measures. In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57, which among other things, eliminated the ability of a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court.

1. Effect of This Bill

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult court of a crime that they committed at the age of 14 or 15 and is now before the juvenile court for resentencing. The avenue for triggering resentencing by the juvenile court would be a grant of recall pursuant to the LWOP resentencing statute (i.e., Penal Code section 1170(d).). Under the provisions of this bill, the prosecutor would have to file the transfer motion, and the juvenile court would have to make a determination that the person is not amenable to treatment in juvenile court before the person may be transferred.

This bill was introduced in response to the recall and resentencing of Andy Williams, who was sentenced to 50 years-to-life in prison after he was convicted of two counts of murder and 13 counts of attempted murder for committing a mass shooting at his high school when he was 15 in 2001. Williams became eligible for parole in September 2024 but was found unsuitable for release by the parole board.^[3] In January of this year, a judge granted Williams’ petition for recall and resentencing relying on case law that found a sentence of 50-year-to-life for a juvenile offender was the functional equivalent of LWOP and excluding someone with his type of sentence from the recall and resentencing law violates equal protection. (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608.) The ruling in Heard was recently clarified to find that Heard’s reasoning does not apply to a request for resentencing if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed. (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 791.)

The district attorney handling the resentencing matter appealed the decision. Earlier this month, a status hearing was held. If the appellate court upholds the lower court’s ruling, Williams could be resentenced in juvenile court, leading to his immediate release from prison.^[4] The next hearing is schedule for December.

1. Argument in Support

The bill’s sponsor, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, writes:

AB 1959 addresses a critical flaw in our laws, a loophole that permits the release of mass shooters and other violent offenders without adequate review of rehabilitation or the safety of our communities. We must act decisively to ensure schools and places of worship remain safe havens, not targets. Victims, survivors, and communities deserve justice that is both fair and unwavering.

Under existing law, Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) allows recall and resentencing of individuals sentenced to life without parole as minors after at least 15 years of incarceration. The 2022 Court of Appeal decision in People v. Heard expanded this process to include those with what the court termed “de facto” life sentences, meaning sentences that allow parole consideration by a parole board, resulting in a surge of petitions from those convicted of the most egregious crimes. This interpretation bypasses critical judicial review and undermines the Legislature’s original intent. Especially concerning is that juvenile offenders under 16 can be released without any meaningful demonstration of rehabilitation, remorse, or assurance of public safety. Instead of thorough resentencing, they move directly to a juvenile disposition, often resulting in release without a true assessment of risk or justice for victims.

AB 1959 is a targeted, balanced response. It restores the court’s discretion to weigh factors related to rehabilitation, youthful offender factors, and public safety. Critically, AB 1959 amends Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) section 707 to allow prosecutors to seek transfer hearings for minors who commit violent crimes. This change empowers courts to consider whether such perpetrators should be resentenced as adults, ensuring that the most serious offenses receive appropriate accountability while maintaining judicial oversight and the possibility of rehabilitation for deserving youth.

Consider the 2001 Santana High School shooting by Andy Williams, who killed two students and wounded 13 others. Less than six months after the Parole Board determined he posed an undue public safety risk, Williams petitioned for recall of his sentence. Less than 18 months after his three-year parole denial, the trial court recalled his sentence and transferred his case to juvenile court, where he will be ordered released without consideration of public safety factors. Under current law, the court lacks discretion to decide whether Williams should be transferred back to adult court for a full resentencing hearing as contemplated by the Legislature when they enacted 1170(d)(1). Without the changes proposed by AB 1959, this loophole threatens the integrity of our justice system and the safety of our communities.

AB 1959 will close this dangerous gap. By strengthening the law and amending WIC 707, it ensures that the gravest acts committed in our communities are met with serious consequences and rigorous judicial review. This reform restores public trust and delivers justice to victims, families, and all Californians.

1. Argument in Opposition

According to La Defensa:

[AB 1959] authorizes transfer of a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

Beginning in 2005, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”…

… Senate Bill 1391 righted a wrong that was perpetuated in 1994 under Governor Pete Wilson when the minimum age for adult court jurisdiction was lowered from 16 to 14. S.B. 1391 was based on “developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development confirming that children are different from adults in ways that are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences.” Since S.B. 1391 took effect in 2019, no evidence shows that prohibiting the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult court has increased risks to public safety.

…

… S.B. 1391 was enacted based, in part, on data showing that 89.6% of youth transferred to adult court under California’s direct filing system were youth of color. …

Data demonstrates that these inequities persist today. In fiscal year 2021-22, Black youth were approximately 17 times more likely than white youth to have a transfer hearing ordered; by fiscal year 2022-23, that disparity had grown to approximately 21 times. Transfer outcomes reveal the same troubling pattern. Latino youth were nearly four times more likely than white youth to have their case transferred to adult criminal court in fiscal year 2021-22, and 12 times more likely in fiscal year 2022-23. Black youth were around nine times more likely than white youth to have their case transferred in fiscal year 2021-22, and around 30 times more likely in fiscal year 2022-23. These inequalities mirror broader inequities experienced by Black and Latino youth, including unequal access to quality education, employment (especially higher-earning jobs), safe housing, credit, and good health care.

…

These same patterns are illustrated in charging and sentencing outcomes in San Diego County under district attorney and sponsor of AB 1959, Summer Stephan. Under the former DA, Black defendants were approximately five times more likely than white defendants to face life without parole. Under current DA Stephan, that figure reportedly increased to approximately 23 times more likely. These data underscore the need to avoid expanding mechanisms that would expose youth of color to harsher punishment in the adult criminal legal system.

AB 1959 will also have significant fiscal costs given the need for more transfer hearings―the most resource-intensive proceedings in juvenile courts, by far―followed by a rise in protracted adult court prosecutions. By contrast, keeping youth in juvenile jurisdiction has massive long-term savings, as the juvenile system is designed to rehabilitate kids, thereby reducing costs associated with recidivism.

-- END --

1. Roper involved burglary and murder in the first degree. Graham involved armed burglary and armed robbery. Miller involved murder and aggravated robbery. Caballero involved attempted murder. ↑

2. SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, Statutes of 2017; see In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049-1052 [Section 1170, subd. (d)(2), which provides an avenue for juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms to seek resentencing, does not provide an adequate remedy at law for Miller error; the inquiry under § 1170, subd. (d)(2), is not designed to address Miller error, and will not necessarily provide a defendant with the lawful sentence that Miller requires.].) ↑

3. See Quinn Welsch, 25 years later, San Diego-area high school shooter eyes release

   (Feb. 23, 2026) available at <https://www.courthousenews.com/25-years-later-san-diego-area-high-school-shooter-eyes-release/>. ↑

4. Shannon Handy, Andy Williams Santana High School shooting release decision delayed as appeal process continues (Jun. 22, 2026) available at <https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/local/andy-williams-santana-high-school-shooting-release-decision-delayed-appeal-process-continues/509-4da061b1-f6b9-4d7f-b4af-000a9119ba79>. ↑

ASSEMBLY THIRD READING

ATR Bill Id:AB 1959

Author:(Patel)

As Amended Ver:April 9, 2026

Majority vote

SUMMARY

Authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

Major Provisions

COMMENTS

According to the Author

"AB 1959 seeks to close a loophole within resentencing law that has recently been exploited in San Diego County by a school shooter at Santanna High School in 2001. San Diegans deserve to have faith in their justice system to ensure that violent offenders that do not show accountability are using this loophole."

Arguments in Support

According to the San Diego District Attorney's Office, the sponsor of this bill, “Under existing law, Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) allows recall and resentencing of individuals sentenced to life without parole as minors after at least 15 years of incarceration. The 2022 Court of Appeal decision in People v. Heard expanded this process to include those with what the court termed "de facto" life sentences, meaning sentences that allow parole consideration by a parole board, resulting in a surge of petitions from those convicted of the most egregious crimes. This interpretation bypasses critical judicial review and undermines the Legislature's original intent. Especially concerning is that juvenile offenders under 16 can be released without any meaningful demonstration of rehabilitation, remorse, or assurance of public safety. Instead of thorough resentencing, they move directly to a juvenile disposition, often resulting in release without a true assessment of risk or justice for victims.

"AB 1959 is a targeted, balanced response. It restores the court's discretion to weigh factors related to rehabilitation, youthful offender factors, and public safety. Critically, AB 1959 amends Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) section 707 to allow prosecutors to seek transfer hearings for minors who commit violent crimes. This change empowers courts to consider whether such perpetrators should be resentenced as adults, ensuring that the most serious offenses receive appropriate accountability while maintaining judicial oversight and the possibility of rehabilitation for deserving youth."

Arguments in Opposition

No longer applicable.

FISCAL COMMENTS

According to the Assembly Committee on Appropriations:

1. Unknown, likely minor costs to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund) for additional transfer hearings in juvenile court. The bill applies to a narrow population: individuals who were convicted in adult court for crimes committed at age 14 or 15 and whose LWOP or de facto LWOP sentences have been recalled and referred to juvenile court for resentencing. If the juvenile court grants transfer to adult court, the case would be resentenced in adult criminal court rather than adjudicated in juvenile court. The number of individuals affected is expected to be very small.
2. Unknown, potentially significant incarceration costs on CDCR (General Fund). To the extent the bill results in individuals being resentenced in adult court rather than juvenile court, it could result in longer periods of incarceration in state prison rather than disposition through the juvenile system. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $128,000. CDCR estimates the annual cost is $135,921.

VOTES

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-1

YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos

ABS, ABST OR NV: Sharp-Collins

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 14-0-1

YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Dixon, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta, Tangipa

ABS, ABST OR NV: Caloza

UPDATED

VERSION: April 9, 2026

CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002837

Date of Hearing: April 22, 2026

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Buffy Wicks, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1959

Author:(Patel) – As Amended Ver:April 9, 2026

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No

SUMMARY:

This bill authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person to adult criminal court who was previously convicted as an adult for a crime committed at age 14 or 15 and is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court following a grant of recall under the life-without-the-possibility-of-parole (LWOP) resentencing statute for juvenile offenders.

FISCAL EFFECT:

1. Unknown, likely minor costs to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund) for additional transfer hearings in juvenile court. The bill applies to a narrow population: individuals who were convicted in adult court for crimes committed at age 14 or 15 and whose LWOP or de facto LWOP sentences have been recalled and referred to juvenile court for resentencing. If the juvenile court grants transfer to adult court, the case would be resentenced in adult criminal court rather than adjudicated in juvenile court. The number of individuals affected is expected to be very small.
2. Unknown, potentially significant incarceration costs on CDCR (General Fund). To the extent the bill results in individuals being resentenced in adult court rather than juvenile court, it could result in longer periods of incarceration in state prison rather than disposition through the juvenile system. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $128,000. CDCR estimates the annual cost is $135,921.

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. According to the author,

AB 1959 seeks to close a loophole within resentencing law that has recently been exploited in San Diego County by a school shooter at Santanna High School in 2001. San Diegans deserve to have faith in their justice system to ensure that violent offenders that do not show accountability are using this loophole

1. Background. Under existing law (SB 9, Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012), a person sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for an offense committed before age 18 may petition the court for recall and resentencing after serving at least 15 years. If the court grants recall, it holds a new sentencing hearing and may impose a lesser sentence. This mechanism was created in response to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions holding that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes and that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. Separately, courts have extended the recall statute on equal protection grounds to juveniles serving de facto LWOP sentences — sentences so long that they exceed the individual’s natural life expectancy, such as 50 years to life.

In 2001, 15-year-old Charles Andy Williams committed a mass shooting at Santana High School in Santee, killing two students and wounding 13 others. He was tried as an adult, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 50 years to life. He was found unsuitable for parole in September 2024. In January 2026, a judge granted Williams’ petition for recall and resentencing, finding that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP. With recall granted, Williams’ case was referred to juvenile court for resentencing. The DA sought to transfer the case back to adult court, where Williams could face a longer sentence. However, existing law permits a transfer motion for a 14- or 15-year-old only in limited circumstances — specifically, where the individual was not apprehended before the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Because Williams was apprehended, tried, and convicted as an adult at the time of his offense, he does not meet that criterion, and there is no other statutory basis for the DA to seek transfer. This bill addresses that gap by creating a new pathway for transfer when a person was previously convicted in adult court and is now before the juvenile court for resentencing under the recall statute. The juvenile court would still be required to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual is not amenable to rehabilitation before ordering transfer.

1. Related Legislation. AB 1701 (DeMaio) would have prohibited persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed as juveniles from seeking recall and resentencing for school shootings. AB 1701 failed passage in Assembly Public Safety.

Analysis Prepared by: Shiran Zohar / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing:

Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Nick Schultz, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1959

Author:(Patel) – As Introduced Ver:February 13, 2026

As Proposed to be Amended in Committee

SUMMARY:

Authorizes a prosecuting attorney to file a motion to transfer a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 who is now subject to resentencing by the juvenile court pursuant to a grant of recall under provisions of law that authorizes a person who received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto LWOP sentence to file a motion for recall and resentencing.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
2. Establishes criteria to determine whether to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
3. States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
4. States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)
5. States that in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the following criteria, inclusive:
   1. The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication;
   2. Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature;
   3. The minor’s previous delinquent history. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior;
   4. Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs; and,
   5. The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. The court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
6. Provides that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances has been found true, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be a sentence of LWOP or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 190.5.)
7. Allows an inmate serving a sentence of LWOP for an offense that was committed when the inmate was under 18 years of age to petition the court to have that sentence recalled and to be resentenced if the inmate has served at least 15 years of their sentence and meets certain other specified criteria. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1).)
8. Excludes from the recall and resentencing process for persons sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed when the person was under 18 years of age where it was pled and proved that the defendant tortured their victim, or the victim was a public safety official, including a law enforcement personnel or a firefighter. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(B).)
9. Provides that if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statements provided by the defendant, as specified, is true, the court shall recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence. Victims or victims’ family members shall retain rights to participate in the hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
10. States that the factors the court may consider when determining whether to resentence the defendant to a life term include, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law;
    2. The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP;
    3. The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant;
    4. Prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP, the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered from psychological or physical trauma or significant stress;
    5. The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness, developmental disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense but influenced the defendant’s involvement in the offense;
    6. The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse;
    7. The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others through letter writing, calls, or visits or has eliminated contact with individuals outside of prison who are currently involved with crime; and,
    8. The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the last five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(6).)
11. States that a defendant whose sentence is not recalled or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP, may submit another petition when the defendant has served at least 20 years. If that petition is denied or the defendant is resentenced to LWOP under the new petition, the defendant may file another petition after having served 24 years. The final petition may be submitted during the 25th year of the defendant’s sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(10).)
12. Establishes the Youthful Offender Parole Program which provides an incarcerated person the opportunity for a parole hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for crimes committed before the age of 25, after having served 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration depending on their controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
13. Provides that a youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by BPH for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger, or was under 18 years of age and sentenced to LWOP, at the time of the controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1).)
14. Specifies the following timeline for youth offender parole hearings to occur:
    1. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a determinate sentence shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration;
    2. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of less than 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 20th year of incarceration;
    3. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration; and,
    4. A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).)
15. States that in assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if used by BPH, shall be administered by licensed psychologists employed by the board and shall take into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1).)

FISCAL EFFECT:

Unknown

COMMENTS:

1. Author's Statement: According to the author, “AB 1959 seeks to close a loophole within resentencing law that has recently been exploited in San Diego County by a school shooter at Santanna High School in 2001. San Diegans deserve to have faith in their justice system to ensure that violent offenders that do not show accountability are using this loophole.”
   
2. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: As a general rule, any person between the age of 12 and 17 who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time of arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
   
   The creation of the juvenile court, now over 100 years old, was rooted in the idea that adolescents, who are not fully developed or mature, are less culpable than adults. Accordingly, the focus of the juvenile court was rehabilitation, not punishment. (See e.g., In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 15-16.) The purpose of the juvenile law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the court and to preserve and strengthen family ties when possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a wide range of options available for placing its wards, including probation, placement in a relative's home, foster home, licensed community care facility, or group home, and commitment to “a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp” or “the county juvenile hall.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a); 730, subd. (a)(1).)
3. Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sentencing of Juveniles: The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) California’s constitution contains a similar prohibition: “Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)

For over two decades, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished the constitutionally permissible punishment of juvenile offenders from adults. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ruled that persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense are ineligible for the death penalty, reasoning that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any offender under 18, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551.) Penal Code section 190.5 codified the holding of Roper and stated the penalty for a person 16 to 18 years of age convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances is either LWOP or, at the court’s discretion, 25-years-to-life. (Pen. Code, § 190.5, subd. (b).)

In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth who did not commit homicide to LWOP. (See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48.) The Court discussed the fundamental differences between a juvenile and adult offender and reasserted its findings from Roper that juveniles have lessened culpability than adults due to those differences. The Court stated that “life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” noting that a juvenile offender “will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 70.) However, the Court stressed that “while the Eighth Amendment forbids a State from imposing a sentence of life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.” (Id. at p. 75.)

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, held that it is unconstitutional for states to mandate a sentence of LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide. “Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other--the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile . . . will receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses--but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 476-477.) Following Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders must be applied retroactively in all cases. (Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 206.)

The California Supreme Court, relying on Miller, concluded that sentencing a juvenile offender for a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268.) The Court stated that "the state may not deprive [juveniles] at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the future." (Ibid.) Caballero had received a 110-to-life sentence (three consecutive life terms) for attempted murder. While the court in Caballero pointed out that these incarcerated persons may file petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the trial court, the court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole eligibility mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto life term for crimes committed as a juvenile.

Roper, Miller, Graham, and Caballero establish that minors are constitutionally different from adults and emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit the most serious crimes.^[1] Notably, these decisions do not support crime-specific exclusions from their findings on the distinctive attributes of youth that mitigate criminal culpability.

1. Overview of Existing Laws on Resentencing and Parole Process for Youthful Offenders: In accordance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court discussed above, SB 9 (Yee)^[2] was signed into law in 2012 to provide juveniles sentenced to LWOP a mechanism for recall and resentencing. Pursuant to SB 9, a person who was under 18 years of age at the time of committing an offense for which the person was sentenced to LWOP could, after serving at least 15 years in prison, petition the court for recall and resentencing. If a resentencing hearing is granted, the court has the discretion whether to resentence the petitioner to a lower sentence or let the LWOP sentence remain. If granted a lower sentence, the petitioner must still serve the minimum sentence before being eligible for parole consideration and obtain approval of the parole board and the Governor prior to release on parole. A broader version of SB 9 made it through much of the legislative process in 2011 but due to intense opposition by law enforcement and victims groups the bill failed passage on the Assembly Floor. The bill was held over until the following year and amended to add exclusions for persons sentenced to LWOP for an offense where they tortured their victim or the victim was a public safety official.^[3] The bill passed the Legislature in the more limited form and was signed by the Governor in 2012.

A few years later, SB 1084 (Hancock)^[4] modified the resentencing law to clarify when a youthful offender could petition for recall and resentencing, the standard by which the court is to review the petition, and that a petitioner who does not have their sentence recalled or is resentenced to LWOP can submit another petition after a specified number of years.

After creating the judicial mechanism to resentence youthful offenders from LWOP to a life sentence with the possibility of parole, the Legislature established Youthful Offender Parole, which provides a parole process for inmates sentenced to lengthy prison terms for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age.^[5] This process applies to inmates serving both indeterminate sentences and determinate sentences. In 2015, youthful offender parole was amended to apply to inmates who were under the age of 23 at the time those crimes were committed based on neurological research that “shows that cognitive brain development continues well beyond age 18 and into early adulthood. For boys and young men in particular, this process continues into the mid-20s. The parts of the brain that are still developing during this process affect judgment and decision-making, and are highly relevant to criminal behavior and culpability.”^[6] In 2017, youthful offender parole was amended to apply to inmates who were 25 years of age or younger at the time of the offense.^[7] Also in 2017, youthful offender parole was amended to apply to persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 years of age.^[8]

The LWOP recall and resentencing law and the Youthful Offender Parole process are two separate processes with some overlap. The recall and resentencing law provides incarcerated persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18 an opportunity for recall and resentencing after serving 15 years. The Youthful Offender Parole process provides persons sentenced to a life sentence for crimes committed prior to turning 26 and persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed prior to turning 18. Excluded from both the recall and sentencing law and youth offender parole are persons who committed their offense between the ages of 18 to 25 for which they were sentenced to LWOP.

1. History of Juvenile Transfer Laws: In 1961, the Legislature set 16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court. (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88.) In 1995, the state began to move away from this rule by permitting some 14- and 15-year-olds to be transferred to criminal court. (Ibid.) In 2000, the voters passed Proposition 21 which required prosecutors to charge minors 14 years or older directly in criminal court for specified murder and sex crimes. Additionally, the Proposition gave prosecutors discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly in adult criminal court for other serious specified offenses. (Ibid.)

In the years following the passage of Proposition 21, the United State Supreme Court issued several opinions regarding the need to treat juveniles differently from adults in the criminal justice system. Developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development confirmed that children are different from adults in their relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities and that such differences are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571 [prohibited capital punishment for juveniles]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 [prohibited life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles in non-homicide cases]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–470 [prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles].) The Court summarized those differences in Miller:

Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at 570.)

The California Supreme Court, relying on Graham and Miller, found that a determinate sentence that exceeds the expected lifetime of the juvenile defendant violates the Eighth Amendment because it effectively denies a juvenile any opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267) and that a law that provides a presumption in favor of LWOP for juveniles also violates the Eighth Amendment (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1375-1376).

Following this body of case law and research, several measures were adopted to reflect the scientific evidence and constitutional mandate to treat juveniles differently than adults. In 2016, Proposition 57 eliminated direct filing in adult court by amending Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to require a transfer hearing to be held before a minor can be prosecuted in adult court. In 2018, the Legislature raised the youngest age a minor could be tried as an adult back to 16. (SB 1391 (Lara), Ch. 1012, Stats. 2018.) The age change was challenged as an invalid amendment to Proposition 57 but the California Supreme Court ultimately ruled that SB 1391 furthered the ameliorative purposes of Proposition 57 and the proposition authorized such amendments by a majority vote of the Legislature. (People v. Superior Court (O.G.) (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82.)

This bill would authorize a prosecutor to file a transfer motion for a person who was previously convicted in adult criminal court for an offense enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code 707(b) when they were 14 or 15 and is now subject to resentencing pursuant to the LWOP resentencing law for juveniles. Generally, a juvenile who committed their offense under the age of 16 is not authorized to receive an LWOP sentence. However, some courts have granted recall under the LWOP resentencing law for persons sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence, e.g. 50-years-to-life, based on equal protection arguments, which could apply to persons younger than 16 when the crime was committed.

1. Impetus for this Bill: In 2001, 15-year-old Charles Andy Williams committed a mass shooting at a high school in Santee, killing two students and wounding 13 others. In 2022, Williams was charged as an adult and he pleaded guilty to two counts of murder and 13 counts of attempted murder and was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. He became eligible for parole in September 2024 but was found unsuitable for release by the parole board.^[9]

In January of this year, a judge granted Williams’ petition for recall and resentencing relying on case law that found a sentence of 50-year-to-life for a juvenile offender was the functional equivalent of LWOP and excluding someone with his type of sentence from the recall and resentencing law violates equal protection. (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608.) The ruling in Heard was recently clarified to find that Heard’s reasoning does not apply to a request for resentencing if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed. (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 791.)

The district attorney handling the resentencing matter has announced they will appeal the superior court’s ruling granting recall. If Williams’ case remains in the juvenile court, he would not be subject to resentencing on an adult conviction because the crime was committed when he was 15. Existing law specifies that a person may only be transferred to adult court for a crime committed when they were 14 or 15 if they were apprehended after the juvenile court’s jurisdiction has ended. Williams was already tried and convicted, thus this exception would not apply.

This bill would provide a narrow expansion to existing law that authorizes persons to be transferred to adult court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 if they were apprehended after the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has ended. The bill would additionally authorize a person who was previously convicted in adult court of a crime that they committed at the age of 14 or 15 and is now before the juvenile court for resentencing. The avenue for triggering resentencing by the juvenile court would be a grant of recall pursuant to the LWOP resentencing statute. A prosecuting attorney would still have to file the transfer motion and the juvenile court would have to make a determination that the person is not amenable to treatment in juvenile court before the person may be transferred.

1. Argument in Support: No longer relevant.
   
2. Argument in Opposition: No longer relevant.
   
3. Related Legislation:
   1. AB 1647 (Bryan) would require the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of by clear and convincing evidence, that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for purposes of transfer to adult criminal court. The hearing on AB 1647 was canceled at the request of the author.
   2. AB 1701 (DeMaio) would prohibit a person sentenced to LWOP for a crime committed while the person was under the age of 18 from seeking recall and resentencing for an offense that meets the definition of a school shooting as defined by this bill. AB 1701 failed passage in this committee.
   3. AB 1968 (Gallagher) would add the crime of conspiracy to commit murder to the list of specified offenses for which a person may be committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for an offense committed at the age of 14 or older, or transferred to adult criminal court for a crime committed at the age of 14 or 15 if they were not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. AB 1968 failed passage in this committee and was granted reconsideration.
   4. AB 2040 (Macedo) would lower the burden of proof, from clear and convincing evidence to preponderance of the evidence, required to find a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for purposes of transfer to adult criminal court. AB 2024 is pending hearing in this Committee.
      
4. Prior Legislation:
   1. SB 481 (Durazo), of the 2021-22 Legislative Session, would have authorized a court to dismiss a special circumstance in cases where a person was sentenced to LWOP. SB 481 was ordered to the inactive file.
   2. AB 965 (Stone), Chapter 577, Statutes of 2019, requires a person’s youth offender parole hearing to occur within six months of the first year they become eligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
   3. AB 1308 (Stone), Chapter 675, Statutes of 2017, expanded the youth offender parole process to persons who committed their crimes when they were 25 years of age or younger.
   4. SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, Statutes of 2017, made a person who was convicted of an offense that was committed before the age of 18 and for which a sentence of LWOP has been imposed eligible for youth offender parole hearing during their 25th year of incarceration and required BPH to complete, by July 1, 2020, all hearings for individuals who are or will be entitled to have their parole suitability considered at a youth offender parole hearing.
   5. SB 1084 (Hancock), Chapter 867, Statutes of 2016, made technical clarifying changes to the recall and resentencing law enacted by SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012.
   6. SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471, Statutes of 2015, expanded the youth offender parole process to apply to those who committed their crimes before the age of 23.
   7. SB 260 (Hancock), Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013, established a process for BPH to conduct youth offender parole hearings for inmates who committed their crimes prior to the age of 18, except inmates sentenced under the Three Strikes law or One Strike Sex Offense Law, or sentenced to LWOP.
   8. SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012, authorized an inmate who was under 18 years of age at the time of committing an offense for which they were sentenced to LWOP to petition the sentencing court for recall and resentencing, except inmates who tortured their victim or whose victim was a public safety official.
      

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles County Deputy Probation Officers Afscme Local 685
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Assocation
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside County District Attorney
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
San Diego County District Attorney's Office
Teamsters Local 986
2 Private Individuals

Opposition

ACLU California Action
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
Alliance for Children's Rights
Building Healthy Communities Monterey County
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
California Juvenile Justice Commissioners Collaborative
California Public Defenders Association
California Youth Defender Center
Californians for Safety and Justice (CSJ)
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)
Community Interventions
Courage California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Fresh Lifelines for Youth (FLY)
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Glide
Hoops 4 Justice
Human Rights Watch
Initiate Justice
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Milpa Collective
National Center for Youth Law (NCYL)
Restore 180
Restoring Hope California
Rubicon Programs
San Francisco Public Defender's Office
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering
The Gathering for Justice
The W. Haywood Burns Institute
Universidad Popular
Urban Peace Institute
Urban Peace Movement
Welcome Home Oasis
Youth Alliance
Youth Forward
Youth Law Center
1 Private Individual

Analysis Prepared by:

Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744

1. Roper involved burglary and murder in the first degree. Graham involved armed burglary and armed robbery. Miller involved murder and aggravated robbery. Caballero involved attempted murder. ↑

2. Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012; Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d).) ↑

3. Assem. Amend to Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) July 2, 2012. ↑

4. Chapter 867, Statutes of 2016. ↑

5. SB 260 (Hancock), Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013.; Pen. Code, § 3051. ↑

6. SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471, Statutes of 2015; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 261 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 1, 2015, p. 2. ↑

7. AB 1308 (Stone), Chapter 675, Statutes of 2017. ↑

8. SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, Statutes of 2017; see In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049-1052 [Section 1170, subd. (d)(2), which provides an avenue for juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms to seek resentencing, does not provide an adequate remedy at law for Miller error; the inquiry under § 1170, subd. (d)(2), is not designed to address Miller error, and will not necessarily provide a defendant with the lawful sentence that Miller requires.].) ↑

9. See https://www.courthousenews.com/25-years-later-san-diego-area-high-school-shooter-eyes-release/ [accessed Feb. 24, 2026]. ↑