AB 2281: Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-09-19
Current Status:
Passed
(2026-09-19: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 337, Statutes of 2026.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law establishes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity within the Secretary of States office to coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents and to monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process. Existing law requires the Office of Elections Cybersecurity, among other things, to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity in consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations.
This bill would also authorize the office to consult with academic researchers for that purpose. The bill would require the office to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Existing law establishes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity within the Secretary of States office to coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents and to monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process. Existing law requires the Office of Elections Cybersecurity, among other things, to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity in consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations.
This bill would also authorize the office to consult with academic researchers for that purpose. The bill would require the office to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Existing law establishes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity within the Secretary of States office to coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents and to monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process. Existing law requires the Office of Elections Cybersecurity, among other things, to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity in consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations.
This bill would also authorize the office to consult with academic researchers for that purpose. The bill would require the office to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Existing law establishes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity within the Secretary of States office to coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents and to monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process. Existing law requires the Office of Elections Cybersecurity, among other things, to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity in consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations.
This bill would also authorize the office to consult with academic researchers for that purpose. The bill would require the office to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
(a)There is established within the Secretary of State the Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
(b)The primary missions of the Office of Elections Cybersecurity are both of the following:
(1)To coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
(2)To monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
(c)The Office of Elections Cybersecurity shall do all of the following:
(1)Coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
(2)In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies, academic researchers, and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
(3)In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
(4)Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county elections officials.
(5)Assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
(6)Advise the Secretary of State on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
(7)Serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local elections officials on election cybersecurity issues.
(8)Coordinate efforts within the Secretary of State to protect the security of internet-connected elections-related resources, including all of the following:
(i)The states online voter registration system established pursuant to Section 2196.
(ii)The statewide voter registration database developed in compliance with the requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 20901 et seq.).
(iii)The Secretary of States election night results internet website.
(iv)The online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Chapter 4.6 (commencing with Section 84600) of Title 9 of the Government Code.
(v)Other parts of the Secretary of States internet website.
(9)Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and prospective voters, with valid information from elections officials such as a county elections official or the Secretary of State.
(a)There is established within the Secretary of State the Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
(b)The primary missions of the Office of Elections Cybersecurity are both of the following:
(1)To coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
(2)To monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
(c)The Office of Elections Cybersecurity shall do all of the following:
(1)Coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
(2)In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies, academic researchers, and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
(3)In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
(4)Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county elections officials.
(5)Assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
(6)Advise the Secretary of State on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
(7)Serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local elections officials on election cybersecurity issues.
(8)Coordinate efforts within the Secretary of State to protect the security of internet-connected elections-related resources, including all of the following:
(i)The states online voter registration system established pursuant to Section 2196.
(ii)The statewide voter registration database developed in compliance with the requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 20901 et seq.).
(iii)The Secretary of States election night results internet website.
(iv)The online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Chapter 4.6 (commencing with Section 84600) of Title 9 of the Government Code.
(v)Other parts of the Secretary of States internet website.
(9)Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and prospective voters, with valid information from elections officials such as a county elections official or the Secretary of State.
(a)There is established within the Secretary of State the Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
(b)The primary missions of the Office of Elections Cybersecurity are both of the following:
(1)To coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
(2)To monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
(c)The Office of Elections Cybersecurity shall do all of the following:
(1)Coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
(2)In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies, academic researchers, and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
(3)In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
(4)Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county elections officials.
(5)Assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
(6)Advise the Secretary of State on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
(7)Serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local elections officials on election cybersecurity issues.
(8)Coordinate efforts within the Secretary of State to protect the security of internet-connected elections-related resources, including all of the following:
(i)The states online voter registration system established pursuant to Section 2196.
(ii)The statewide voter registration database developed in compliance with the requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 20901 et seq.).
(iii)The Secretary of States election night results internet website.
(iv)The online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Chapter 4.6 (commencing with Section 84600) of Title 9 of the Government Code.
(v)Other parts of the Secretary of States internet website.
(9)Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered prospective voters, with valid information from elections officials such as a county elections official or the Secretary of State.
(a)There is established within the Secretary of State the Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
(b)The primary missions of the Office of Elections Cybersecurity are both of the following:
(1)To coordinate efforts between the Secretary of State and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
(2)To monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
(c)The Office of Elections Cybersecurity shall do all of the following:
(1)Coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
(2)In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies agencies, academic researchers, and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
(3)In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
(4)Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county elections officials.
(5)Assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
(5)(6)Advise the Secretary of State on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
(6)(7)Serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local elections officials on election cybersecurity issues.
(7)(8)Coordinate efforts within the Secretary of State to protect the security of Internet-connected internet-connected elections-related resources, including all of the following:
(i)The states online voter registration system established pursuant to Section 2196.
(ii)The statewide voter registration database developed in compliance with the requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 20901 et seq.).
(iii)The Secretary of States election night results Internet Web site. internet website.
(iv)The online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Chapter 4.6 (commencing with Section 84600) of Title 9 of the Government Code.
(v)Other parts of the Secretary of States Internet Web site. internet website.
(8)
(9)Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered voters, with valid information from elections officials such as a county elections official or the Secretary of State.
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Date
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Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 19, 2026 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 337, Statutes of 2026. |
| Sep 19, 2026 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 10, 2026 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 60. Noes 11.). |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 60. Noes 11. Page 6918.). |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 30. Noes 10.). |
| Aug 4, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 3, 2026 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8. |
| Jul 1, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 30, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 4. Noes 1.) (June 30). |
| May 20, 2026 | Referred to Com. on E. & C.A. |
| May 12, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 11, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 55. Noes 9.) |
| May 11, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 55. Noes 9. Page 4991.) |
| May 11, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| Apr 30, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 29, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 10. Noes 1.) (April 29). |
| Apr 15, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 1.) (April 15). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 9, 2026 | Referred to Com. on ELECTIONS. |
| Feb 20, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 22. |
| Feb 19, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 30, 2026 | AB 2281 Berman Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 30, 2026 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB2281 Berman By Stern | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Jun 30, 2026 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Elections and Constitutional Amendments |
Passed |
|
| May 11, 2026 | AB 2281 Berman Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 29, 2026 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 15, 2026 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Elections |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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|---|---|---|
| Public Citizen's Democracy Campaign | ** Support |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 2281
Author:(Berman)
As Amended Ver:July 1, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Authorizes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) within the Secretary of State′s (SOS) Office to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity. Requires the SOS to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Senate Amendments
Make a technical change.
COMMENTS
AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, established the OEC within the SOS′s office. The OEC has two primary missions. First, it is responsible for coordinating efforts between the SOS and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC is also tasked with monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election. According to the OEC′s website, the office serves California with the sole purpose of keeping every Californian′s vote safe from online interference, especially the spread of mis- and disinformation.
In 2018, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established within the federal Department of Homeland Security to maintain public trust and confidence in United States election systems. Since CISA′s creation, many state and local elections officials have relied on CISA′s free and voluntary assistance, expertise, and resources—as well as its partnerships with other agencies— to help protect election systems. Last year, the federal government made considerable changes to federal election cybersecurity support, funding, and infrastructure, including cutting funds to two information sharing centers supported by CISA. In response, the non-profit organization that operates both centers announced temporarily transitioning to charging state and local governments for membership and providing fee-based services.
The Senate amendments make a technical change. This bill, as amended in the Senate, is consistent with prior Assembly actions.
According to the Author
″Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, AB 2281 would direct the OEC [to] assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks. Additionally, this bill would strengthen OEC by authorizing them to consult with academic researchers, allowing them to utilize their expertise in support of OEC′s mission.″
Arguments in Support
In support of a prior version of this bill, Public Citizen′s Democracy Campaign, wrote: ″With highly regarded institutions across the state, such as the University of Southern California′s Center for Inclusive Democracy and the Election Administration Research Center at University of California[] Berkley, California has significant election law and administrative resources to draw from. Additionally, according to US News and Word Reports, California has two of the top undergraduate computer science programs for cybersecurity in the country. These academic resources, and the people that constitute them, should be activated by the state government to stay current with our election cybersecurity systems and best practices. Cybersecurity threats to state elections abound…Despite a marked increase in cybersecurity threats, federal election cybersecurity aid and coordination has drastically shrunk under the current presidential administration…These decisions create serious risks for California′s election systems. AB 2281 would attempt to identify how state resources can be used to fill these holes.″
Arguments in Opposition
None received.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8, negligible state costs.
VOTES:
ASM ELECTIONS: 6-1-1
YES: Pellerin, Bennett, Berman, Elhawary, Solache, Stefani
NO: Gallagher
ABS, ABST OR NV: Johnson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 10-1-4
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
NO: Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Hoover, Dixon, Muratsuchi, Ta
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-9-16
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Davies, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Ransom, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO: DeMaio, Dixon, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Castillo, Chen, Ellis, Flora, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Lowenthal, Quirk-Silva, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Solache, Soria, Ta, Wallis
UPDATED
VERSION: July 1, 2026
CONSULTANT: Nichole Becker / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094 FN: 0003773
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 2281 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 2281
Author: Berman (D)
Amended: 7/1/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE ELECTIONS & C.A. COMMITTEE: 4-1, 6/30/26
AYES: Wiener, Allen, Cervantes, Umberg
NOES: Choi
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-9, 5/11/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Office of Elections Cybersecurity
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government and permits the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes, under the SOS, the OEC and tasks the OEC with the following:
- Coordinating efforts between the SOS and local election officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
- Monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
- Requires the OEC to do all of the following:
- Coordinate between federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
- In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
- In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
- Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county election officials.
- Advise the SOS on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
- Serve as a liaison between the SOS, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local election officials on election cybersecurity issues.
- Coordinate efforts within the SOS to protect the security of internet-connected elections-related resources, including the state’s online voter registration system, the statewide voter registration database (VoteCal), the SOS’ election night results website, online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the SOS (CalAccess), and other parts of the SOS’ website.
- Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or other platforms, mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered voters, with valid information from election officials or the SOS.
This bill:
- Requires the SOS to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
- Permits the OEC to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
- Makes minor and technical changes.
Background
Office of Elections Cybersecurity. AB 3075 (Berman, Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018) established the OEC, known as the Election Security Program, within the SOS’ office. The OEC has two primary missions. First, it is responsible for coordinating efforts between the SOS and local election officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC is also tasked with monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election. According to the OEC’s website, the office serves California with the sole purpose of keeping every Californian’s vote safe from online interference, especially the spread of mis- and disinformation. The SOS also provides information on how to identify incorrect election information, information on where to find correct election information, and ways to report false or misleading information.
Additionally, the OEC works with federal, state, and local partners to share election security information and best practices. This includes the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Department of Technology, California Office of Emergency Services, California Highway Patrol, and county election officials. Cybersecurity trainings with federal and state partners, as well as organizing tabletop exercises and drills for county election officials, are also hosted by the OEC.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works with partners at every level to coordinate efforts relating to information on critical infrastructure in the United States. This includes election security and cybersecurity. In 2025, 130 CISA positions were eliminated and funding for information-sharing programs under CISA were terminated. This led to new concerns with the agency’s ability to provide information and combat domestic and foreign cyber threats.
Comments
Author’s Statement. I was proud to author legislation in 2018 to create the OEC, which is tasked with coordinating efforts between federal, state, and local officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that threaten the integrity of California elections. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, this bill would direct OEC to assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks. Additionally, this bill would strengthen OEC by authorizing them to consult with academic researchers, allowing them to utilize their expertise in support of OEC’s mission.
Related/Prior Legislation
AB 3075 (Berman, Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018) established the OEC within the SOS’ office.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/3/26)
None received
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/3/26)
None received
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-9, 5/11/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Davies, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Ransom, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: DeMaio, Dixon, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Tangipa
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Castillo, Chen, Ellis, Flora, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Lowenthal, Quirk-Silva, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Solache, Soria, Ta, Wallis
Prepared by: Scott Matsumoto / E. & C.A. / (916) 651-4106
8/5/26 15:04:36
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Senator Scott Wiener, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: Hearing Date: 6/30/26
Author: | |||
Version: |
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Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
Subject:
DIGEST
This bill requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government and permits the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
ANALYSIS
Existing law:
- Establishes, under the SOS, the OEC and tasks the OEC with the following:
- Coordinating efforts between the SOS and local election officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
- Monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections.
- Requires the OEC to do all of the following:
- Coordinate between federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
- In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
- In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
- Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county election officials.
- Advise the SOS on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
- Serve as a liaison between the SOS, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local election officials on election cybersecurity issues.
- Coordinate efforts within the SOS to protect the security of internet-connected elections-related resources, including the state’s online voter registration system, the statewide voter registration database (VoteCal), the SOS’ election night results website, online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the SOS (CalAccess), and other parts of the SOS’ website.
- Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or other platforms, mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered voters, with valid information from election officials or the SOS.
This bill:
- Requires the SOS to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
- Permits the OEC to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
- Makes technical changes.
BACKGROUND
Office of Elections Cybersecurity. AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, established the OEC within the SOS’ office. The OEC has two primary missions. First, it is responsible for coordinating efforts between the SOS and local election officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC is also tasked with monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election. According to the OEC’s website, the office serves California with the sole purpose of keeping every Californian’s vote safe from online interference, especially the spread of mis- and disinformation. The SOS also provides information on how to identify incorrect election information, information on where to find correct election information, and ways to report false or misleading information.
Additionally, the OEC, known as the Election Security Program, works with federal, state, and local partners to share election security information and best practices. This includes the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Department of Technology, California Office of Emergency Services, California Highway Patrol, and county election officials. Cybersecurity trainings with federal and state partners, as well as organizing tabletop exercises and drills for county election officials are also hosted by the OEC.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works with partners at every level to coordinate efforts relating to information on critical infrastructure in the United States. This includes election security and cybersecurity. In 2025, 130 CISA positions were eliminated and funding for information-sharing programs under CISA were terminated. This led to new concerns with the agency’s ability to provide information and combat domestic and foreign cyber threats.
COMMENTS
- Author’s Statement. I was proud to author legislation in 2018 to create the OEC, which is tasked with coordinating efforts between federal, state, and local officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that threaten the integrity of California elections. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, this bill would direct OEC to assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks. Additionally, this bill would strengthen OEC by authorizing them to consult with academic researchers, allowing them to utilize their expertise in support of OEC’s mission.
- Technical Amendment. This bill amends the existing framework of the OEC. One of the requirements of the OEC is to assess false or misleading information regarding the electoral process, mitigate false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered voters, with valid information from election officials or the SOS. The term, “unregistered,” is ambiguous and potentially conflicting because a person is or is not a voter. The author notes this provision is aimed at educating voters, such as preregistered voters. Committee staff recommends the bill be amended to replace “unregistered” with “prospective” voters.
RELATED/PRIOR LEGISLATION
AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, to establish the OEC within the SOS’ office.
PRIOR ACTION
Assembly Floor: | |
Assembly Appropriations Committee: | |
Assembly Committee: |
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POSITIONS
Sponsor: Author
Support: None received
Oppose: None received
-- END --
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 2281
Author:(Berman)
As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Authorizes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) within the Secretary of State′s (SOS) Office to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity. Requires the SOS to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Major Provisions
COMMENTS
AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, established the OEC within the SOS′s office. The OEC has two primary missions. First, it is responsible for coordinating efforts between the SOS and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC is also tasked with monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election. According to the OEC′s website, the office serves California with the sole purpose of keeping every Californian′s vote safe from online interference, especially the spread of mis- and disinformation.
In 2018, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established within the federal Department of Homeland Security to maintain public trust and confidence in United States election systems. Since CISA′s creation, many state and local elections officials have relied on CISA′s free and voluntary assistance, expertise, and resources—as well as its partnerships with other agencies— to help protect election systems. Last year, the federal government made considerable changes to federal election cybersecurity support, funding, and infrastructure, including cutting funds to two information sharing centers supported by CISA. In response, the non-profit organization that operates both centers announced temporarily transitioning to charging state and local governments for membership and providing fee-based services.
According to the Author
″Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, AB 2281 would direct the OEC [to] assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks. Additionally, this bill would strengthen OEC by authorizing them to consult with academic researchers, allowing them to utilize their expertise in support of OEC′s mission.″
Arguments in Support
In support of this bill, Public Citizen′s Democracy Campaign, writes: ″With highly regarded institutions across the state, such as the University of Southern California′s Center for Inclusive Democracy and the Election Administration Research Center at University of California[] Berkley, California has significant election law and administrative resources to draw from. Additionally, according to US News and Word Reports, California has two of the top undergraduate computer science programs for cybersecurity in the country. These academic resources, and the people that constitute them, should be activated by the state government to stay current with our election cybersecurity systems and best practices. Cybersecurity threats to state elections abound…Despite a marked increase in cybersecurity threats, federal election cybersecurity aid and coordination has drastically shrunk under the current presidential administration…These decisions create serious risks for California′s election systems. AB 2281 would attempt to identify how state resources can be used to fill these holes.″
Arguments in Opposition
None received.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, minor and absorbable costs to the SOS.
VOTES
ASM ELECTIONS: 6-1-1
YES: Pellerin, Bennett, Berman, Elhawary, Solache, Stefani
NO: Gallagher
ABS, ABST OR NV: Johnson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 10-1-4
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
NO: Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Hoover, Dixon, Muratsuchi, Ta
UPDATED
VERSION: February 19, 2026
CONSULTANT: Nichole Becker / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094 FN: 0002458
Date of Hearing: April 29, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2281
Author:(Berman) – As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2026
Policy Committee: | Elections | Vote: | 6 - 1 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the Secretary of State’s (SOS’s) Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
This bill also authorizes the OEC to consult with academic researchers as part of OEC’s existing duty to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Minor and absorbable costs to the SOS.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, AB 2281 would direct the OEC [to] assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks.
- Background. OEC. AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, established the OEC within the SOS to coordinate efforts between the SOS and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC also monitors and counteracts false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election.
Federal Election Cybersecurity Resources. In 2018, federal law established the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the federal Department of Homeland Security to maintain public trust and confidence in U.S. election systems. Since CISA’s creation, many state and local elections officials have relied on CISA’s free and voluntary assistance, expertise, and resources to help protect election systems. Last year, the federal government made considerable changes to federal election cybersecurity support, funding, and infrastructure, including cutting funds to two information sharing centers supported by CISA. In response, the non-profit organization that operates both centers announced temporarily transitioning to charging state and local governments for membership and providing fee-based services. This bill requires the OEC to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
Analysis Prepared by: Irene Ho / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 15, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
Gail Pellerin, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2281 (
Author:Berman) – As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2026
SUBJECT: Office of Elections Cybersecurity.
SUMMARY: Authorizes the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC) within the Secretary of State’s (SOS) Office to consult with academic researchers to develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity. Requires the SOS to assess whether additional state resources are needed to replace election cybersecurity resources previously provided by the federal government.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the OEC within SOS’s office. Provides that the primary missions of the OEC are both of the following:
- To coordinate efforts between the SOS and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in the state.
- To monitor and counteract false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms and that may suppress voter participation or cause confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of elections. (Elections Code §10.5(a), (b))
- Requires the OEC to do all of the following:
- Coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies the sharing of information on threats to election cybersecurity, risk assessment, and threat mitigation in a timely manner and in a manner that protects sensitive information.
- In consultation with federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations, develop best practices for protecting against threats to election cybersecurity.
- In consultation with state and local agencies, develop and include best practices for cyber incident responses in emergency preparedness plans for elections.
- Identify resources, such as protective security tools, training, and other resources available to state and county elections officials.
- Advise the SOS on issues related to election cybersecurity, and make recommendations for changes to state laws, regulations, and policies to further protect election infrastructure.
- Serve as a liaison between the SOS, other state agencies, federal agencies, and local elections officials on election cybersecurity issues.
- Coordinate efforts within the SOS to protect the security of Internet-connected elections-related resources, including the state’s online voter registration system, the statewide voter registration database (referred to as VoteCal), the SOS’s election night results Internet Web site, online campaign and lobbying filing and disclosure system developed by the SOS (also known as CalAccess), and other parts of the SOS’s website.
- Assess the false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or other platforms, mitigate the false or misleading information, and educate voters, especially new and unregistered voters, with valid information from elections officials such as a county elections official or the SOS. (Elections Code §10.5(c))
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Purpose of the Bill: According to the author:
I was proud to author legislation in 2018 to create the Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC), which is tasked with coordinating efforts between federal, state, and local officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that threaten the integrity of California elections. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has cut critical funding, coordination, and support that helped states guard against threats to our election systems. Given the loss of federal election cybersecurity infrastructure, AB 2281 would direct the OEC [to] assess if additional state resources are needed to ensure that California officials continue to have the information and tools necessary to defend our democracy from cyber-attacks. Additionally, this bill would strengthen OEC by authorizing them to consult with academic researchers, allowing them to utilize their expertise in support of OEC’s mission.
- Cybersecurity and Previous Legislation: In 2018, the Assembly Elections & Redistricting Committee (now referred to as the Assembly Elections Committee) and the Senate Elections & Constitutional Amendments Committee held a joint informational hearing on the topic of Cybersecurity and California Elections. Due to increased focus on election security since the 2016 elections, the purpose of the hearing was to explore California's policies for protecting the security of its elections systems in an environment where the number and sophistication of threats to election infrastructure continues to increase. At that hearing, the committees heard from federal, state, and county elections officials and other experts regarding the extent of the threat to the security of our elections and options for additional steps that California can take to protect the integrity of our elections and to bolster public confidence in the election results.
There were several common recommendations made by witnesses at the hearing for putting state and county elections officials in the best position to defend against and respond to cyber threats, and to protect public confidence in California elections. One of the recurring themes that emerged during the testimony at the informational hearing was that maximizing the cybersecurity of our state's elections will require additional resources dedicated to that purpose. Many witnesses stressed the importance of coordinating the sharing of cybersecurity information and resources, particularly with smaller counties that have more limited resources, and of developing robust post-election auditing procedures—including risk-limiting audits—to improve voter confidence in the accuracy of election results. Other recommendations included improving efforts to take advantage of security expertise in the private sector and at academic institutions in the state, ensuring that elections officials develop cyber incident response plans that include considerations of how to recover from cyber incidents, and working with third-party validators to help disseminate accurate information about elections as a way to counter bad information that could negatively impact elections and voter confidence.
Subsequently, the Legislature approved and Governor Brown signed AB 3075 (Berman), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2018, to establish the OEC within the SOS’s office. The OEC has two primary missions. First, it is responsible for coordinating efforts between the SOS and local elections officials to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could interfere with the security or integrity of elections in California. The OEC is also tasked with monitoring and counteracting false or misleading information regarding the electoral process that is published online or on other platforms that may suppress voter participation, cause confusion, or disrupt the ability to ensure a secure election. According to the OEC’s website, the office serves California with the sole purpose of keeping every Californian’s vote safe from online interference, especially the spread of mis- and disinformation - Critical Infrastructure Designation: In January 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure is a designation "established by the Patriot Act and given to 'systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.'" This designation enabled DHS to prioritize cybersecurity and physical security assistance to elections officials.
DHS prepared a Cybersecurity Services Catalog for Election Infrastructure that outlines the services and other assistance available to the election infrastructure community, including state and local elections officials. Among the services provided are various no-cost cybersecurity assessments, information sharing about cybersecurity threats, cybersecurity training, assistance in cyber incident planning and cyber incident response, and network protection. - Federal Election Security Services: In 2018, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established, within DHS, and made responsible for maintaining public trust and confidence in United States election systems. CISA has worked with government agencies and the private sector to address election threats, including cybersecurity threats and physical security concerns. Since CISA’s creation, many state and local elections officials have relied on CISA’s free and voluntary assistance, expertise, and resources—as well as its partnerships with other agencies—to help protect election systems by sharing timely and actionable threat information and offering cybersecurity services to safeguard their election systems. For instance, CISA has sponsored regional tabletop training exercises and drills to teach local elections officials how to respond when cyber or physical incidents threaten the conduct of elections.
Moreover, through its partnership with the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), CISA has provided elections officials with the information they needed to protect themselves from cyber threats and shared actionable information about electoral infrastructure incidents with states and local governments. In 2024, EI-ISAC was a crucial resource for providing elections officials with information about Election Day bomb threats and suspicious white powder mailings that occurred in 15 states, including California.
Additionally, through its partnership with Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), state and local governments were provided with no-cost and low-cost cybersecurity threat prevention, protection, response, and recovery. CISA has provided funds to support the MS-ISAC under a cooperative agreement with the Center for Internet Security (CIS) for nearly 20 years. - Recent Federal Changes to CISA: Last year the federal government made considerable changes to federal election cybersecurity support, funding, and infrastructure. In February 2025, media articles reported that CISA had made significant staffing cuts and froze all of its election security work as part of a review of CISA’s operations by DHS. While DHS completed its review of CISA’s election security activities last March, the results of the review have not been publicly released. Subsequent media reports stated that acting CISA Director Bridget Bean circulated a memo announcing that the administration had cut off all funds to support EI-ISAC, which was funded through DHS grants.
Additionally, last March, CISA announced a $10 million cut in funding for MS-ISAC. It was reported that the $10 million allocated by CISA accounted for just under half of MS-ISAC’s funding.
In an effort to address its funding gap, media articles report that CIS, the non-profit that operates and houses both MS-ISAC and ES-ISAC, is temporarily transitioning into charging state and local governments for memberships in the EI-ISAC and MS-ISAC and providing a fee-based service to some non-government, election-related organizations.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file.
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Nichole Becker / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):